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In commissioning this study by Dr. John Gearson, 
Director of the Defence Studies Centre and his team 
at King’s College London, we saw this as a means of 
making both a positive contribution to the debate whilst 
giving something back to a Department that has been 
a very significant source of work for the construction 
industry for many decades. We also saw it as a means 
of delivering tangible and reciprocal benefits within 
the scope and spirit of the Military Covenant, and in so 
doing moving closer to meeting the obligation owed by 
the Nation to its servicemen and women. 
It is readily accepted that the work undertaken 
by King’s College London and Morgan Sindall 
Group plc does not provide a panacea. It is also 
acknowledged that the thoughts and ideas advanced 
here are not fully costed and analytically evaluated, 
but they are nevertheless well positioned to stimulate 
a broader dialogue at the behest of the Ministry of 
Defence. In offering these thoughts we prefer the more 
contemporary view that the absence of a perfect solution 
no longer justifies doing nothing.
This work is an open invitation to politicians and civil 
servants, as well as those engaged in industry, commerce 
and other professions, to engage in a “conversation” 
aimed at improving the resilience, flexibility and 
economic efficiency of the Ministry of Defence whilst 
acknowledging at the same time that the United 
Kingdom has to face up to harsh economic realities with 
difficult choices to be made.
Those engaged in the world of academia and business 
cannot unilaterally solve such complex problems, but 
they can occasionally act as a catalyst for constructive 
and innovative dialogue and that, in a nutshell, is the 
primary objective of this paper.
Our un-reserved thanks are extended to Dr. Gearson 
and his team at King’s College London for the insight, 
enthusiasm and application they brought to this study. 
The activities of the Ministry of Defence have a prominence and visibility not afforded many of 
the other Departments of State. The current exploits and experiences of the United Kingdom’s 
Armed Forces in live theatre operations are on the front pages of every daily newspaper and 
at the heart of every television News Programme. Public empathy and sympathy for the lot of 
servicemen and women and their families currently runs very high but is not generally extended 
to the civil organisation that supports their endeavours.
Foreword
Paul Whitmore 
Commercial Director
Morgan Sindall Group plc
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Preface
Modern armed forces also need headquarters, training 
colleges and exercise areas, logistic depots and repair 
facilities and much more besides.  The land, buildings 
and engineering and other facilities supporting the British 
Armed Forces comprise a set of major national assets that 
requires careful day to day management, but one that also 
offers long term opportunities for securing a better return 
from the capital invested.  Defence cannot afford not to 
explore all the possible avenues to that end, as identified 
in this report.
As someone who has in the past worked in the MoD on 
managing the defence programme and had to try to juggle 
resources and commitments during times of financial 
pressure, I know how important it is to be able step back 
and look objectively at how assets are being used and 
Armies have traditionally needed to provide barracks for their soldiers; modern volunteer forces 
depend upon the provision of decent homes and caring communities for service families as well.  
The military covenant has become the shorthand expression for the implicit contract that the 
country makes to look after its armed forces and their families in return for the exceptional service 
they render the nation.   Fulfilling the contract in an age of austerity is tough for a government 
rightly committed to reducing the budget deficit.
renewed.  Finding more imaginative ways of using the 
defence estate to the full by bringing in expertise from the 
property and commercial world should be central to the 
current work of the MoD to implement the outcome of 
the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review. Being 
more efficient is not in contradiction with upholding 
the military compact; on the contrary it is how it can be 
afforded.
I am glad that the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s 
College with which I am associated has been able to 
contribute the HERO Review to assist Morgan Sindall 
Group plc with their re-examination of these issues for 
defence estates, and I commend the ideas in it as worthy 
of further exploration.
 
Sir David Omand GCB
Visiting Professor of Defence Studies, King’s College London
Deputy Under-Secretary for Defence Policy and Programmes, 1993 - 1996
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The announcement in February 2011 of the 
restructuring of the Defence Estates (DE) into the Defence 
Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) goes a long way to 
reorienting the management of the defence estate into a 
leaner and more commercially nimble organisation. Many 
of the challenges the DE faced will also be faced by the 
DIO, and it is those challenges, principally of finance, 
utilisation and disposal, and the future of single living and 
service family accommodation, that are dealt with in this 
report. 
The Military Covenant 
As an idea, the Military Covenant has gone from 
the comparative obscurity of a historical convention to 
a contemporary piece of Army doctrine that is at the 
heart of Britain’s defence policy and public discourse 
about it. The members of the armed forces have rarely 
been held in higher esteem outside of a national crisis, 
notwithstanding public controversy over the rationale 
for recent operational deployments. The Covenant has 
become the prism through which every aspect of military 
welfare is viewed, including medical treatment, housing 
and family support, placing pressure on Governments to 
give service personnel a better deal, or the promise of one. 
A key recommendation within this report is that better 
use of the defence estate provides an opportunity for the 
Government to fulfil some of the expectations that the 
Covenant raises (both in its historical and post-SDSR 
form), but also to recast the offer to service personnel and 
their families in a positive way. The evidence suggests 
that the support and happiness of service families has 
a significant impact on the ability of our armed forces 
to fulfil their mission, and to that end it is incumbent 
on the British defence establishment to ensure that the 
reasonable needs and aspirations of service families can 
be met consistent with operational effectiveness. (See 
Chapter One)
Finance
The continued funding of the defence estate represents 
a major challenge in the context of lowering Government 
expenditure and the need to manage defence resources 
more effectively, itself a key requirement of the coalition 
Government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR). Future ambitions for improved management 
and operation of resources allocated to the defence estate 
will need to recognise fully the effects of reduced funding. 
The significance of this reduced funding will manifest 
itself on both the operational side of the DE/DIO and on 
the management and deployment of capital resources for 
planned and future investment programmes.
 
Since the 1990’s the use of private finance in public 
sector procurement has steadily risen, primarily through 
the use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model. 
There have been many success stories arising from use 
of private finance in a range of differing sectors with 
fixed price contracts, high performance standards and an 
ongoing commitment to asset management as key tenets. 
At the same time, there has been critical questioning 
of whether some PFI projects have achieved true value 
for money (VfM) as well as satisfying affordability 
constraints. In the case of the MoD, in particular, there 
have been questions about flexibility and the ability of 
some PFI contracts to respond to change over a typical 
25/30 year outlook, although the provision of new 
single living accommodation is generally regarded as a 
successful use of private finance. 
It is unlikely given the current political Government 
procurement policy that ‘traditional’ PFI deals will form 
a significant proportion of the financing for DE/DIO 
capital projects in the future. They are now perceived 
to be too inflexible over the life of many projects, too 
burdensome at the tendering stage and in the current 
climate too problematic to fund via necessarily cautious 
banking groups. New approaches such as Local Asset 
Backed Vehicles (LABV) and Local Improvement 
Finance Trust (LIFT) structures appear to offer the 
best opportunities for defence estate funding in the 
medium term. They offer the flexibility and partnership 
arrangements that the review team believe will be crucial 
to the future of the defence estate, and the changing 
operational environment expected in the period up to 
2020, the period of the SDSR’s focus. In this context 
The defence estate is one of the British Government’s largest and strategically significant 
collections of assets. It is an important component of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) asset 
holdings, which directly impacts on the majority of service personnel. The effective operation 
and management of the defence estate have been shown to be important factors in the retention 
of military personnel. With the country labouring under an unprecedented level of public debt 
and in the context of a major defence review, with defence reform as one of the Government’s key 
priorities, this inquiry into the defence estate is both timely and important. 
Executive Summary
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HM Treasury’s desire for capital receipts, without inward 
investment into the DE/DIO, is and has been unhelpful. 
The Localism Bill, and the political signals surrounding 
it, opens up some interesting possibilities for the DE/DIO 
and its private sector partners. A key part of the future 
mix of defence estate provision will come through these 
local partnerships. The review team also think that there 
is scope to bring aspects of the defence estate to market, 
such as the core infrastructure, via specific funds offered 
by private finance groups. 
The HERO Review argues therefore that the future 
financing of the defence estate will need to be closely 
tied up with the Government’s localism agenda. Land-
swaps and ‘release to reprovide’ schemes (which closely 
bind the needs of public authorities and their commercial 
partners) are innovative ways of providing future funding 
to the defence estate in an age when large capital 
expenditures are unlikely to be approved or funded by 
HM Treasury. Such schemes are also capable of widening 
the impact of the economic footprint that defence leaves 
in the UK and moving the defence community nearer to 
the wider society that they are drawn from. (See Chapter 
Two)
Utilisation
One of the major areas of underdeveloped thinking 
within the defence community (despite past and current 
internal reviews by DE) is the utilisation of various parts 
of the estate. Those who have worked in this area told the 
team that the major barriers to utilising the defence estate 
were established Treasury rules (the so-called ‘Green 
Book’). These rules may well be relaxed – probably 
by mid-2011 – which would dramatically change this 
picture and free up public authorities to make greater use 
of their assets. Given the scale of the savings the coalition 
Government needs to make, the better utilisation of 
the defence estate will in and of itself not contribute a 
particularly significant amount to that end. What is clear, 
however, is that there is a political imperative to make 
these reforms, and to ‘mainstream’ this kind of utilisation 
and commercialisation within the public services. If fully 
realised, this transformative political agenda will have 
a lasting legacy on the defence community (as it will in 
other policy areas), eroding the conceptual and practical 
divisions between public and private sectors. 
The HERO Review team are not anticipating 
wholesale reform, freeing up Government departments 
to become quasi-businesses free to enter new markets - 
they must still focus on core tasks - but there are some 
sensible and obvious partnership arrangements that 
would help reduce the cost of running the defence estate 
and bring in valuable income. The HERO Review team 
believe that the new DIO should make the sustainability 
of the defence estate a priority. Wider utilisation of the 
estate, including dealing with waste and generating 
sustainable electricity, could make a strong contribution 
to the Government’s sustainability and renewable energy 
targets, whilst making a modest financial contribution 
to the running costs of the estate. Encouraging local 
managers to make better economic use of the estate, to 
mainstream entrepreneurialism and thrift, will ensure the 
estate is at the forefront of the national effort to do more 
with less. The HERO Review team agrees with those 
in MoD who concluded that nothing less than a major 
cultural shift would be required to achieve this result 
within the defence sector. (See Chapter Three)
Facilities management 
Facilities management (FM) is commonly divided into 
two categories, though many companies provide both 
services, sometimes simultaneously. ‘Hard FM’ refers to 
the provision and upkeep of buildings and equipment, 
Soft FM’ refers to the provision of on-site services such 
as catering. There is an industry trend towards Total FM 
(via mergers and acquisitions), that is, a single company 
providing both hard and soft FM and front of house 
service as part of a single contract, although this trend 
does not seem to have been so keenly followed in the 
defence sector. The current model is mostly one whereby 
construction firms make a company acquisition of a ‘soft-
FM’ provider, to create the in-house capability, or via 
careful contractual relations. 
Some FM contracts retain the same inflexibility 
that can be observed in traditional PFI deals. Building 
in flexibility increases the cost of the service being 
provided many-fold, but it is this kind of flexibility 
that is required in a defence context that is subject to 
changing operational needs. The review team found 
no evidence of the MoD attempting to model the costs 
of providing these services in-house, where the risk 
factor could be consumed within departmental budgets: 
namely extra-services would incur the same risk as 
the private contractors, but any savings would be kept 
in-house rather than having been passed on as part of a 
private contractors risk calculation. A comprehensive 
critical evaluation of whether the flexibility required by 
the defence community lends itself to fixed contracts is 
overdue: defence may be one of the special cases across 
Government where operational flexibility trumps the 
need for fixed pricing, but the political necessity currently 
is for continued outsourcing. 
How far the total FM concept should be extended in 
the defence sector remains unclear, although the review 
team has its doubts as to the scope for wide application in 
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defence unless a significant degree of flexibility is capable 
of being attached to such contracts. The HERO Review 
has only been able, in the time available, to look at a few 
examples. To consider the scope for the total FM concept 
and other important issues for the future, the HERO 
Review recommends that an independent investigation 
should be conducted across all the components of the 
estate from which the ‘right size’ of the defence estate 
to meet the demands of the SDSR is and what role the 
private sector should play in managing non-operational 
parts of the estate, to assist the DE/DIO in its planned 
shrinkage and in becoming a ‘thin-client’. Only in this 
way will the MoD be able to confidently assert that it is 
guiding the defence estate in the right direction to meet 
the needs of the armed forces, their families and the 
public purse in delivery support for defence provision in 
the long rather than the short term. (See Chapter Four)
Single Living Accommodation (SLA)
Project SLAM is reported to have delivered good 
quality SLA across the armed forces and to a standard 
and level of security that is appreciated by all of those 
who have used it. Project SLAM has delivered a large 
improvement to the SLA stock across the defence estate, 
and seems to be mostly liked by those service men and 
women who use it, with only minor dissent around 
comparative rents and housing standards.
The return from Germany of the remaining 20,000 
British Army personnel based there announced in the 
SDSR, will create the need for significant additional 
SLA facilities, including new build facilities, and thus 
the issue of cost-savings generated by using different 
manufacturing techniques and materials will become 
prominent. In addition, there are some issues around 
innovation and sustainability in the existing SLAM 
model, and the DE’s control of the SLAM concept, that 
may require consideration for the model to be sustainable 
in the longer term. 
The top-end cost of SLAM does appear expensive 
when compared to other types of SLA, (up to £25,000 a 
bed-space more expensive on some measures) even after 
recognition of the security factors built into military SLA 
which could be partly mitigated by it being located in 
different places ‘behind the wire’. If the current design 
parameters were retained, it would make some sense to 
move the SLAM units closer to the wire so that as the 
defence estate footprint is further reduced (as everyone 
expects), the SLAM units could effectively be moved 
outside the wire and used for other purposes, such as 
hotels or conference facilities. This would provide the 
potential for recovering some of the costs of construction 
in the future. Some cost-savings could also be derived 
by introducing some flexibility into the Project SLAM 
model, and by embracing (or going further in the use 
of) some new technologies, such as portable modular 
engineering. This would also open up flexibility across 
the defence estate and the potential for a secondary 
market. The use of new materials technology could also 
assist in meeting sustainability targets. 
 
The HERO Review’s research suggests that 
introducing private money (be it through investment 
funds or existing private SLA providers) into future 
SLA requirements might prove problematic unless the 
DE/DIO fully adopts its thin-client approach and gives 
over management responsibilities to the private sector. 
Reducing this management function could also assist 
the DE/DIO in achieving its institutional rationalisation 
targets. (See Chapter Five)
Service Family Accommodation (SFA)
Service Family Accommodation has been a difficult 
issue within the defence community since at least the 
mid-1990s. Controversies have continued about the 
standard of the accommodation, how it is maintained, its 
cost, the value for money it has represented on disposal 
and the desire of the three services to retain control over 
it, prior to DE assuming control of it. 
The problems with family accommodation run wider 
than crumbling infrastructure; there are the connected 
issues of service personnel not being on the property 
ladder (adversely affecting their personal financial 
planning), of being detached from broader society, 
and of being distant from mainstream and undisrupted 
education. 
The HERO Review did not find any great appetite 
amongst the private financiers contacted to place 
significant investment into new service housing 
(something that is a common problem in the general 
economy as well) and most doubted that it would be 
forthcoming in the short term. There are some land-swap 
and smart-disposal options (including renting SFA to ex-
service personnel) that may help overcome a number of 
these instinctive barriers however.
The HERO Review recommends that the MoD 
should take steps now to begin to relieve itself of 
direct responsibility for the provision service family 
accommodation. To promote levels of home ownership 
in the forces to levels more in line with the civilian sector, 
a military property bond scheme could be established. 
Such an approach, in which service personnel’s payments 
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into the scheme were matched by MoD, would, by the 
end of a 15-year term, provide enough capital to buy a 
SFA or go a long way towards buying a property on the 
open market. The HERO Review team believe that MoD 
should go further and put in place a universal military 
accommodation allowance (pegged to CPI) that would 
support the transition from military accommodation to 
privately owned or rented accommodation. In the short 
term this would maintain the Government’s support 
for subsidised military accommodation, whilst giving 
service personnel unfettered freedom of choice over their 
accommodation. Such a move would also generate long-
term cost savings within the MoD, with the reduction 
in bureaucratic overheads for managing service family 
accommodation, in particular. For single living (SLAM) 
units, the low rent would be replaced by a market rent, 
but in turn would be offset by the universal allowance. 
(See Chapter Six)
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•	 A better use of the defence estate will provide an 
opportunity for the Government to fulfil more of 
the expectations that the military covenant raises 
and also an opportunity to recast the offer to 
service personnel and their families in a positive 
way;
•	 The Government, through the MoD, needs to do 
more to provide good quality life-opportunities, 
through life skills (such as financial awareness 
and mentoring) and vocational training for 
service personnel before they leave the armed 
forces, which (counter intuitively) will improve 
retention rates and post-service outcomes;
•	 Mainstreaming commercial awareness and the 
utilisation of the defence estate will make the 
estate more commercially nimble; 
•	 Closer integration of defence and civil 
communities offers the most promising approach, 
based on the notion of jointly investing 
and benefitting from the creation of new 
accommodation, recreation, leisure, education, 
medical facilities and renewable energy facilities, 
to be branded under localism and mutualism. 
This could initially be achieved through utilising 
the return from Germany and the positive 
£750m economic footprint it will bring;
•	 The MoD should plan to use the defence 
footprint - following the army’s return from 
Germany - to generate inward investment, and 
to seek the best local authority partners for 
meshed community solutions;
•	 New financing arrangements such as LABV, 
LIFT and Land Swap should begin to be used 
instead of PFI arrangements to allow for the 
introduction of new assets to the defence estate, 
whilst disposing of excess assets;
•	 The MoD should proceed with the super 
garrisons concept for the army;
•	 The DE/DIO should issue an industry 
consultation on the SLAM concept, with a view 
to generating efficiencies through innovation;
•	 The MoD should encourage the use of 
contemporary modular features in its SLAM 
concept, so that the SLAM units can be moved 
around the country, as operational or commercial 
needs dictate;
•	 Future SLAM units should be built closer to ‘the 
wire’, so that as the wire contracts SLAM units 
can be used for commercial accommodation or 
the like;
•	 The MoD should relinquish its role in providing 
service family accommodation and instead 
provide a universal military accommodation 
allowance (linked to CPI);
•	 An independent review should be conducted 
into what the ‘right size’ of the defence estate is 
and what role the private sector should play in 
managing non-operational parts of the estate, to 
assist the DE/DIO in its planned shrinkage and 
in becoming a ‘thin-client’ and;
•	 The performance of the DIO should be closely 
monitored and its further transformation into 
either a national corporation (with Value for 
Money considerations at its core), or into a 
wholly private entity able to better interface 
with commercial partners, should be actively 
considered. 
Key Conclusions and Recommendations
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As an element of the October 2010, Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR) it has received little 
media attention – which was mostly focussed on the 
decisions about the Harrier Jump Jets, the future aircraft 
carriers and the reduction in overall military and civilian 
manpower levels – despite a pledge to reduce the running 
costs of the estate by an enormous £350m per year.5 
What the SDSR precisely said about the defence estate 
was: 
[it will include the] rationalisation of the defence 
estate including the sale of surplus land and 
buildings and associated running cost reductions 
and running cost savings across the estate of 
up to £350 million per year including a revised 
approach to the way in which we manage and 
deliver infrastructure services across the estate 
... Our final decisions on the defence estate that 
we will need in 2020 will be taken on the basis of 
detailed investment appraisals and wider impact 
assessments. We plan to be as open as we can be 
and to take decisions as quickly as possible in 
order to minimise uncertainty for the communities 
affected. Our aim will be that our Armed Forces 
will continue to be based in a way which is 
sensitive to economic and social pressures and the 
needs of defence, our people and their families.6
Moreover, the defence estate (its size, management and 
disposal) has received precious little academic attention, 
not even in the context of the SDSR, which has received 
a decent amount of commentary, precisely because it falls 
outside of the more obviously attractive issue areas such 
as operational art, and equipment. The HERO Review 
seeks to address the gap that has been left in wider policy 
and media circles by the failure to give issues around the 
defence estate their proper attention amongst the wider 
defence stakeholder community. It is hoped that this 
review document will be the beginning of a conversation 
between all those who are involved in or who have an 
interest in the running of the defence estate.
The defence estate provides an important backdrop to 
the defence of the realm – it is where the vast majority 
of service personnel are housed, trained and cared for. 
It provides the bedrock of support for the armed forces: 
decisions about British defence are researched, planned 
and executed from the estate. The defence estate does 
not just service the military, however, it also provides a 
valuable source of economic regeneration to the parts of 
the UK that benefit from a military presence in their area. 
The planned return of the British military from Germany 
brings with it a £750m footprint that will be relocated 
to parts of the mainland UK. Such a footprint could be 
1  The MoD owns some 1% of the UK land mass, but less than the Forestry Commission or the National Trust.
2  The MoD categorises some 571 of these 4,000 sites as major – see MoD, Defence Estate Development Plan, (2010)
3  National Audit Office, A Defence Estate of the right size to meet operational needs, HC 70 Session 2010-2011, (The Stationary Office: London, July 
2010), p. 4.
4  The Government Property Unit of Sharex currently operates a challenge function in respect of proposed disposals from the Defence Estate by the 
Ministry of Defence, but does not currently have a strategic role in identifying which elements should be considered for disposal.
5  The armed services are planned to shrink by 17,000 personnel by 2015 and by another 3,500 by 2010. The Ministry of Defence’s civilian work 
force will decline by 25,000 by 2015, Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 
(The Stationary Office: London, October 2010), p.32.
6  Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, (The Stationary Office: London, 
October 2010), p.33.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) owns around 240,000 hectares, has rights of access to a further 
130,000 hectares of land in the United Kingdom and manages a further 200,000 hectares of land 
overseas, making it one of the country’s largest landowners.1 The Defence Estate, which is valued 
at between £20-31 billion depending on the source, is diverse, with some 4,000 sites including 
airfields, naval bases and barracks.2 An estimated £2.9 billion per year is spent on running the 
estate.3 As a result it is one of the British Government’s largest collection of assets, and a important 
component of the Ministry of Defence’s asset holdings, which directly impacts on the majority of 
service personnel and whose effective operation and management has been shown to be important 
factors in the retention of military personnel, as is described later in this report. Under the austerity 
measures announced by the coalition Government in 2010, most of the Government’s property 
holdings are under review by a unit of the Business, Innovations and Skills Department, known as 
SHAREX, but the Defence Estate was kept as a distinct entity.4 As is elucidated later in the report, 
there is some evidence that the Government will incorporate the Defence Estate into the general 
Government land pool, radically shifting the way that the Defence Estate will be considered as part 
of the spending review. 
Introduction
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used strategically to assist in the economic regeneration 
of the UK. This report examines the effect of the ‘defence 
footprint’ on UK in terms of it as a public policy driver in 
maintaining a cross-UK defence presence. 
The HERO Review began in October 2010 with a 
wide remit covering the ‘future of the defence estate’, and 
its analysis captures much of the breadth and complexity 
of the original research design. Following initial research, 
however, and the assessment that there was much about 
the defence estate, which was settled, the review focussed 
its energies on four central themes: 
•	 the future employment model of service men 
and women, via the central theme of the military 
covenant;
•	 the financing of the defence estate, and in 
particular how in future the defence estate might 
be financed and held; 
•	 FM; and, 
•	 the future of Service Family Accommodation.
In reality many of these themes are linked; the defence 
estate is after all a complex mix of interdependencies, but 
each of these themes receives a separate chapter within 
the HERO Review, as they are mostly usefully discussed 
in this individual way.
Throughout the investigation the review team kept the 
following questions at the front of their minds, and whilst 
they do not form discreet sections in the report they 
informed the way in which the problems and challenges 
associated with the defence estate and the Defence 
Estates organisation (DE), as a managing unit, were 
thought about: 
•	 Extrinsic value: As citizens, what are our 
interests in the defence estate? Does it return 
good value for money for the tax revenues 
invested in it? To what extent does this 
investment contribute to effective defence and 
security? 
•	 Intrinsic values: What “values network” can 
be identified across the defence estate? These 
networks will need to be able to derive value to 
add value. How can DE incentivise these broad 
stakeholder communities.
•	 Core Attributes of the defence estate: What is 
the right size and kind of defence estate, and 
what special attributes does it have that make it 
‘defence’ and not something that could be rented 
‘civil’ estate? What is the persistent need in the 
defence estate? 
•	 Ownership Model: What should the ownership 
model be? Can a one-size fits all model be 
applied? Can DE, for example, be run as 
a National Corporation – a joint venture 
entity, part-Government, part-commerce/ 
industry/ part-Academe that is allowed / 
encouraged to make money and look after the 
environment? If so what new services could 
a national corporation provide that have not 
been considered thus far? Can we incentivise 
the management of the DE and all the other 
stakeholders involved? Part of this debate 
has been framed after the research phase had 
finished. The announcement of the creation of 
a Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO), 
in February 2011, provides the Government’s 
answers to some of the questions the review 
explored, but the conclusions that were drawn 
about the management of the defence estate are 
still relevant to the establishment of the DIO and 
the HERO Review has drawn conclusions about 
it in the report. 
•	 Life Cycles: What aspects of the defence life-
cycle does the DE contribute to, and how is that 
changing with the size of force structure, the 
nature of conflict, and the increased utilisation 
of Synthetic Environments? What are the life 
cycles within the DE? 
The HERO Review is based upon over forty interviews 
with policy-makers drawn from the Ministry of 
Defence, the Treasury, and the Department Business, 
Innovation and Skills, as well as serving and retired 
service personnel. The Review also took evidence from 
construction companies, architects, financiers, investment 
managers and providers of FM, whilst being based on a 
foundation of extant academic and survey literature. The 
Review makes no claim to be the final word on this issue, 
nor does it set out to be critical of the Defence Estates 
or Ministry of Defence – its aim, as a King’s College 
London research project, was to provide an independent 
view of the future of the defence estate, acting as critical 
friends to the defence community, in line with the Centre 
of Defence Studies’ long history of public policy work in 
the defence and security realm. 
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The Military Covenant is assumed by many to be a 
centuries-old pledge made to soldiers, perhaps by the Iron 
Duke, and thereafter upheld down the generations. In 
fact while the moral basis of a ‘duty of care’ being owed 
to service personnel may stretch back many hundreds of 
years, the Military Covenant as a documented concept 
has yet to reach its teens. It was only formalised in 
February 2000 as part of Army Doctrine and despite 
being widened to include the Royal Air Force and Royal 
Navy, remains an essentially Army concept, based on 
custom and convention.7 A tri-lateral understanding 
between the individual soldier, the Army and the Nation, 
rather than a legally binding commitment, the Military 
Covenant is yet to be found on the statute book, despite 
the Prime Minister’s commitment to formally codifying 
it in June 2010, and it appears in the draft Armed Forces 
Bill (2011) as a commitment on the Secretary of State for 
Defence to provide an annual statement about how the 
military covenant has been upheld during the previous 
year. 
The covenant was independently reviewed by 
a team led by Oxford University academic, Hew 
Strachan, whose paper, ‘The Report of the Task 
Force on the Military Covenant’ was published in 
December 20108. The Strachan team made a series of 
recommendations (that the Government are not obliged 
to incorporate), which included: the establishment of a 
through-community voluntary covenant commitment 
- incorporating efforts from local authorities, and the 
wider community - Government guidance on how 
departments of state can contribute to the covenant, 
further recognition of service, increasing the levels 
of home ownership and through-service education, 
coordinating veterans charities, and strengthening the 
links between the military and the community. Some 
of these recommendations are echoed in the HERO 
Review’s parallel research effort, albeit with a different 
emphasis that this review’s parameters afford the study.
Broadly, the military covenant sets the terms of the 
deal between the country; those who are prepared to 
risk their lives on its behalf; and, the institution to which 
they belong. Soldiers are prepared to make the ultimate 
sacrifice; in exchange the nation should take care of 
them and their families, with ‘commensurate terms and 
conditions of service’9. 
Soldiers will be called upon to make personal 
sacrifices - including the ultimate sacrifice - in the 
service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the 
Nation and the Army before their own, they forego 
some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the 
Armed Forces.
In return, British soldiers must always be able to 
expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as 
individuals, and that they (and their families) will be 
sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and 
conditions of service.
In the same way the unique nature of military land 
operations means that the Army differs from all other 
institutions, and must be sustained and provided for 
accordingly by the Nation.
This mutual obligation forms the Military Covenant 
between the Nation, the Army and each individual 
soldier; an unbreakable common bond of identity, 
loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the 
Army throughout its history. It has perhaps its 
greatest manifestation in the annual commemoration 
of Armistice Day, when the Nation keeps covenant 
with those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, 
giving their lives in action.10 
Abstract 
This following section provides some background to the concept of the military covenant, which 
is central to the HERO Review’s investigation into the Defence Estate. A key recommendation 
within this report is that better use of Defence Estate provides an opportunity for the Government 
to fulfil some of the expectations that the covenant raises (both in its historical and post-SDSR 
form), but also to recast the offer to service personnel and their families in a positive way. The 
evidence suggests that the support and happiness of service families has a large impact on the 
operational effectiveness of our armed forces, and to that end it is incumbent on the British defence 
community to ensure that the reasonable needs and aspirations of service families can be met in 
a way that does not degrade operational effectiveness. To that end this section also discusses the 
economic and social impact of the defence footprint across the UK, and the New Employment 
Model for service personnel. 
7 Ministry of Defence, Army Doctrine Publication 5: Soldiering, The Military Covenant, AC 71692, February 2000
8  Hew Strachan et al, The Report of the Task Force on the Military Covenant, (Ministry of Defence: London, September 2010), http://www.mod.uk/
NR/rdonlyres/3C6A501D-5A85-47C9-9D89-B99C5E428061/0/militarycovenanttaskforcerpt.pdf, accessed 19 December 2010. 
9  Ministry of Defence, Army Doctrine Publication 5: Soldiering,The Military Covenant, AC 71692, February 2000, para 103.
10  Ministry of Defence, Army Doctrine Publication 5: Soldiering, The Military Covenant, AC 71692, February 2000
Chapter One: The Military Covenant
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The HERO Review has sought to mainstream the 
concept and the new reality of the military covenant 
through its research. It begins from the premise that the 
armed forces and their families deserve a good standard 
of accommodation, befitting their efforts and sacrifices 
in operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The Project 
team also believe that every pound that is poorly used in 
the defence estate (be it the procurement, maintenance 
and disposal of estates assets) is a pound that could have 
been used to provide better accommodation, or to provide 
first class equipment to the frontline. 
The sense of moral obligation between a society and 
the war-fighters who defend or advance its interests it is 
an ancient one, reflected in Plato’s Republic.11 However, 
while there has always been a broad acceptance that 
something should be done for veterans - particularly those 
disabled by their military service - Government-funded 
provision for them in the pre-Welfare State era was at best 
patchy and sporadic. Under an act passed by Elizabeth I’s 
final Parliament every parish had to contribute towards 
the upkeep of injured soldiers and sailors, but this fell into 
abeyance long before the Civil War. Public sympathy has 
generally ebbed and flowed: as memories of a conflict 
faded so too did practical support for veterans or their 
dependants. Both Chelsea’s Royal Hospital founded by 
Charles I, along with its sister institution down-river in 
Greenwich, were the architecturally magnificent symbols 
that something was owed to veterans: perhaps equally 
symbolically the Royal Hospital almost ran out of money 
during the building process and was over-subscribed 
as soon as it opened, similarly, the Royal Hospital in 
Kilmainham, Dublin, which was a home for retired 
soldiers that continued in that use for over 250 years. 
In the 1820s, there were calls in Parliament to cut the 
pensions of the comparatively few rank and file veterans 
of the Napoleonic Wars who received them. Indeed, until 
the Second World War, State-funded war pensions for 
disability or sickness caused by military service were not 
a right but discretionary.
 
Through the ages the informal Military Covenant 
has been a reflection of society, both its values and how 
it sees its armed forces. Although there was no formal 
contract between the nation and its war-fighters, in the 
past civil society has wanted to show its appreciation of 
soldiers, veterans and their dependants through voluntary 
donations if not through its taxes. Charities, regiments 
and individual philanthropists such as Oswald Stoll made 
up for the shortfall of Government aid, particularly to 
the disabled, widows and orphans. After the Crimean 
War and throughout the latter part of the nineteenth 
century as the Army became identified with Empire, 
newspapers galvanized the public into donating to the 
military, via initiatives such as the Zulu Fund and the 
Royal Patriotic Fund. In 2000, the Military Covenant 
somewhat idealistically codified this hitherto informal 
commitment between civil society and the military as 
‘a bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility that has 
sustained the Army throughout its history’.12 In reality 
all too often ‘Thank you Mr Atkins’ has swiftly become 
‘Tommy go away.’13 The team has drawn the lineage for 
the covenant from this historical legacy, rather than the 
2000 codification, which provides only limited scope, and 
thus can argue that the state of the covenant is a reflection 
of society’s disposition towards the armed forces. 
 
Although a recent development, Army doctrine itself 
is regularly updated.14 The Military Covenant was re-
written in 2005, and it seems by then had been largely 
forgotten by soldiers themselves, particularly when 
compared to the Values and Standards of the British 
Army, which set down the institution’s ethos.15 This 
was to change after August 2006, with the advent of Sir 
Richard Dannatt as Chief of the General Staff. With 
an imminent upsurge in troop numbers in Afghanistan 
while a continuing counter-insurgency was being 
fought in Iraq, he was concerned that the Army was 
‘running hot’, and in colloquial terms was suffering 
from ‘overstretch’.16 In his first wide-ranging interview, 
he spoke of the Military Covenant and subsequently 
warned it was ‘out of kilter’ and ‘out of balance’ when 
describing the plight of his under-resourced and over-
stretched Army.17 By 2008, the concept had migrated to 
civil society and was taken up by the media, Opposition 
MPs and Forces’ Charities, with the Royal British 
Legion launching an Honour the Covenant campaign. 
The Covenant became shorthand for all aspects of 
the inadequately funded welfare offered to troops 
fighting on two fronts: it encapsulated everything from 
compensation paid to the injured, via the lack of body 
armour to the treatment of bereaved families. Instead 
of being trilateral, the Covenant was viewed by the 
media as a bilateral commitment between soldiers and a 
11 Plato, The Republic, Translated by Desmond Lee, Penguin 1987 p.256.
12  ADP5, para 103.
13  Rudyard Kipling, Tommy Atkins.
14  British Military Doctrine was first formalized in 1989 - before then, doctrine, such as it was, was transmitted by a process described by Sheffield  
as ‘regimental osmosis’ backed up by a few Field Manuals and writing on the military. Gary Sheffield, ‘Doctrine and Command in the British 
Army: A Historical Overview’, ADP Land Operations, May 2005, p.167.
15  Ministry of Defence, Values and Standards of the British Army, updated January 2008 http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_
british_army.pdf.
16  Britain’s New Top Soldier: ‘Can the Military Cope? I say – Just’, Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 4 September 2006.
17  ‘A Very Honest General’, Sarah Sands, The Daily Mail, 12 October 2006: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-410175/Sir-Richard 
 Dannatt--A-honest-General.html
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Government indifferent to their care. Few commentators 
showed General Dannatt’s tactful restraint: the Covenant 
was ‘broken almost beyond repair’18 according to one 
academic opinion, although others in academia were 
more cautious in their approach to the concept. For 
Christiane Tipping, the Covenant was a ‘portmanteau 
term’ used to describe every military-related failing 
including the loss of Nimrod XV230: Anthony Forster 
focused on the culpability of senior commanders: Helen 
McCartney said the civil-military relationship was under 
stress but not breaking, while Paul Cornish and Andrew 
Dorman implied the Covenant had distracted Ministerial 
attention from other aspects of defence policy.19 
Immediately above the signatures of David Cameron 
and Nick Clegg in their introduction to the recent 
SDSR was a commitment to the renewal of the Military 
Covenant.20 The legal codification of an Armed Forces 
Covenant has proved to be controversial, with the 
Armed Forces Bill only offering an annual statement 
of how the covenant has been implemented, rather 
than a full legal underpinning. As an idea, the Military 
Covenant has gone from the comparative obscurity of 
Army doctrine to the heart of Britain’s defence policy. 
The war in Iraq divided civil society and support for the 
Afghanistan intervention is lukewarm at best. In October 
2010 one opinion poll found that 60 per cent of those 
surveyed opposed the war in Afghanistan:21 However, 
in his first public speech as Chief of the Defence Staff 
[CDS] General Sir David Richards said that the Armed 
Forces were held in higher public esteem than any other 
profession.22 The Covenant helped separate the men and 
women from the mission, firing up the latent goodwill felt 
by the public towards ‘our boys’. 
The subsequent outpouring of support is reflected 
by charitable giving and the turnout at homecoming 
parades and the repatriation of the deceased through the 
Wiltshire village of (soon to be Royal) Wootton Bassett. 
Armed Forces’ personnel have rarely been held in higher 
esteem outside of national crisis. The Covenant became 
the prism through which every aspect of welfare issues 
was viewed, including medical treatment, housing and 
family support, successfully pressurizing the Government 
into giving service personnel a better deal. Military 
equipment and individual kit has been improved and, 
according to the current Chief of the Defence Staff, there 
are no complaints about it.23 The SDSR talked, however, 
of money derived from efficiencies in the running of the 
defence estate and the sale of part of that estate to fund 
frontline equipment, making the estate and the DE that 
administers it, areas for potential radical contraction 
going forward. 
The Military Covenant is now embedded in the 
national DNA: today, the almost 350-year-old Royal 
Hospital in Chelsea now declares that it is ‘keeping the 
Nation’s Covenant with our old soldiers’. Although only 
formalized about a decade ago, the Military Covenant 
writes a new chapter in the history of British civil-
military relations. One way in which the review team 
has sought to engage with this topic is to look at some 
of the body of work that currently occupies Lieutenant 
General Sir Bill Rollo’s personnel policy staff, ‘the New 
Employment Model’. The officials and officers working 
on the New Employment Model were brought together in 
early 2010, and are – in the early part of 2011 – forming 
up into work streams to tackle the issues attendant in the 
employment of service personnel and safeguarding their 
Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS).
Ahead of these New Employment Model work streams 
the review team conducted a body of interviews on this 
subject to be in a position to suggest some areas in which 
the Ministry of Defence could advance the Military 
Covenant for today’s armed forces. 
Current Initiatives and Challenges: 
Resettlement of Wounded, Injured and Sick Armed 
Forces personnel: Defence Career Partnership (DCP)
The Defence Career Partnership is a new MoD 
scheme with industry partners, which offers placement 
opportunities to aid the recovery of wounded, injured 
and sick armed forces personnel across the UK. The 
DCP scheme is seen by MoD as having potentially 
wider application to other service people beyond those 
wounded, injured or sick to widen the duty of care over 
all service personnel and to put them in a better position 
when they leave the armed forces. One priority for the 
MoD could be to enrol more industry partners into this 
project, it could effectively do this by widening out the 
scope of the scheme itself, and it is worthy of note that 
the 2001 Drucker Foundation Report on the US Army 
18 Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Out of Step: The Case for Change in the British Armed Forces, Demos 2007, p.19.
19 Anthony Forster, ‘Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Army in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs, 82:6, Nov 2006, 
pp1045-1057; Christiane Tipping, ‘Understanding the Military Covenant’, RUSI Journal, June 2008; Helen McCartney, ‘The Military Covenant 
and the Civil-Military Contract in Britain’, International Affairs, 86:2, 2010 pp411-428: Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Blair’s Wars and 
Brown’s Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less than a Decade’, International Affairs, 85:2. 2009 pp 247-261.
20 Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, (October 2010), p.6.
21 http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/43408/opposition-to-military-mission-in-afghanistan-reaches-60-in-britain
22 Sir David Richards, speaking at Policy Exchange, 22nd November 2010
23 Sir David Richards, speaking at Policy Exchange, 22nd November 2010
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has won many plaudits within the UK MoD, as have its 
central assertions about the employability of well trained 
and skilled military personnel into civilian industries, 
and for its Partnership for Youth Success (PaYS) scheme 
which provides industry training for army recruits during 
their initial training.24 These initiatives are beginning 
to be copied in the British context, and the evidence 
collected by this review suggests there would be much to 
gain in terms of the employability of ex-service personnel 
and the retention of skills in the military from extending 
these initiatives in the UK.
By signing up industry partners to offer work 
experience, placements, training and employment to 
eligible Service personnel (where those opportunities 
exist in their respective organisations), there could be 
the potential to in effect rework the conditions under 
which service personnel are employed. The DCP 
scheme could be extended to make it a through service 
commitment with industry partners where, for example, 
an individual completes four years military service, with 
a guarantee of two years work in industry at the end of 
their military service, or variants thereof. These figures 
might be massaged to include additional time guaranteed 
in industry for those who have spent a certain amount 
of time in active war-zones, and the option to rejoin the 
military after spending time in industry. An extension to 
this proposal might include the reservists, as an additional 
measure to add flexibility between regular, reserve and 
civilian employment. A pilot version might focus on 
those service personnel who have readily transferable 
skills like logistics experts, vehicle maintenance, air 
maintenance, draughtsmen, bricklayers, electricians, 
plumbers, and mechanics) who might receive some 
appropriate training with industry under an engagement 
that could include conditions that they would be 
released for military employment in the event of defined 
operational defence needs and/or retain a reserve force 
liability beyond their military service engagement. For 
the construction industry, for example, such a scheme 
would be particularly welcomed as it currently suffers 
from an aging or transient workforce and would benefit 
from the opportunity to recruit young fit disciplined 
people accustomed to working in regulated and outdoor 
environments in small dedicated teams. This would be 
enhanced were such potential employees to have acquired 
skill training with industry relevance. Such a scheme 
might include loan-in/loan-out arrangements to address 
pay, allowances and pension rights and the requirement 
for MoD to retain the right to recall someone back into 
active service in the event of operational need.
There are of course a number of barriers to the 
successful operation of such a scheme aside from the 
political or institutional resistance that one might 
normally expect, but which are surmountable. These 
include what arrangements might be put in place 
concerning pay and pensions during industry phases, 
whether industry placements would take place close 
to where the individual and any dependents lives, and 
whether the individual has any choice or control over 
their industry placement. There is also the issue, which 
has been successfully overcome at the UK Defence 
Academy, of how military and civilian qualifications and 
accreditations tally up with each other. 
A Fairer Deal for Service Personnel and their 
Families
At the heart of the notion of the Military Covenant 
is the idea of providing a fair deal for those who have 
served their country with distinction. As a consequence 
the HERO Review team recommend that there should 
be a stronger emphasis on providing good quality 
life-opportunities (in terms of life skills and vocational 
training) for service personnel before they leave the 
armed forces, and when they have left armed service. 
It is important that more attention is paid to providing 
service personnel with ‘civilian life skills’, for example 
ensuring personnel learn a trade before they leave the 
forces, and that a supply chain is established that takes 
advantage of these skill sets once people have left the 
armed forces. Personnel should be either educated to, 
or somehow encouraged to, save a percentage of their 
wages for after service life, and encouraged to think about 
self-employment routes or opportunities for after-service 
life. To this end the Government could consider creating 
an investment angel fund or network to provide funding 
to service personnel, with viable business plans, who 
are leaving the armed forces. The review have heard 
of a large number of service leavers who have joined 
the emergency services and think that there should be 
stronger links to facilitate the move from armed service to 
civilian emergency service, including some overlap. 
The available evidence suggests that the armed forces 
has a problem with Early Service Leavers, 51% of 
recruits leave before the four year mark, and 34% leave 
untrained. The Army has a particular problem with 
early leavers, accounting for 62% of those who leave 
early, whilst the Navy (at 20%) and RAF (at 18%) 
clearly have their numbers more under control.25 Leavers 
from whichever service have a disproportionately high 
24 Drucker Foundation, Innovative Public-Private Partnerships: The United States Army and the Private Sector, (The Conference Board: Washington 
DC, 2001).
25 Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces Resettlement: Early Service Leavers Consultation, (13 December 2010). 
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incidence of extended unemployment after they leave the 
armed forces. There will always be some who find they 
are not suited to military service, but for others who are 
well suited to the forces there should be an remuneration 
escalator that further rewards long service so that at 
distinct markers there are enhancements either in cash 
form (although this is currently recognised through the 
normal route of differential pay rates and resettlement 
packages) or in the form of contributions to some kind 
of endowment trust for after-service life. Similarly, the 
team would encourage the sort of ‘through-Government’ 
commitment that has been talked about by the current 
Government in relation to the military covenant to extend 
to the families and children of those leaving the armed 
forces, to support their reintegration into mainstream 
society vocationally and educationally. Interview 
evidence suggests that the leaving peak – of just under 
four years – can be partly attributed to the rotation of 
personnel and the difficulties their partners face in finding 
employment. Leaving the armed forces was one way that 
people faced with this domestic problem sought to deal 
with it. 
This kind of ‘change management’ has been 
underexplored in official circles, but remains an important 
topic for Armed Forces charities. The management of 
this change is important in bringing the armed forces 
closer to the communities they are drawn from and serve. 
There are a large number of areas in which it might be 
possible to see the closer integration of defence and civil 
communities, based on the notion of jointly investing and 
benefitting from the creation of new accommodation, 
recreation, leisure, education, medical facilities and 
renewable energy facilities. 
Insofar as a number of these facilities and services 
might be delivered by private sector suppliers, or in more 
proactive engagement with local authorities, this may 
create the opportunity for employment opportunities 
for service leavers, thus providing a partially assisted 
route to civil employment. This potential might be 
considered also in the context of the scope for wider 
“Defence Communities” with reduced change of location 
for services families and hence improved family home 
stability (and ownership levels) and educational and 
employment continuity.
The Defence Footprint
One of the unintended consequences of the defence 
estate is the positive effect it can have on local civilian 
communities. The vast majority of defence activity in 
the UK occurs in the South of England, yet much of 
the army’s personnel – for example – are drawn from 
the North of England and Scotland. The military 
establishments in Scotland have been described as 
essential to those local economies (as recent discussions 
about the Kinloss and Lossiemouth bases have made 
clear). The positive aspects of this relationship can be 
seen in the direct and indirect employment opportunities 
that are created by the armed forces, inward investment 
by personnel and the MoD, improved local services 
and transportation links. The defence community has 
always benefitted from being closely embedded in these 
communities because of the community cohesion that 
has been fostered, and because of the additional services 
provided by local authorities because of the population 
numbers. 
Whilst there are further opportunities for local 
communities and defence establishments to share more 
facilities, with appropriate controls, the macro point 
remains that a constriction of the operational estate 
into fewer sites will disproportionately hit communities 
based in Scotland which are almost entirely reliant 
on their military establishment for their economic 
survival. Greater emphasis could be placed, in a time 
of recession, on using the defence estate as a tool for 
economic regeneration (and even survival) in the most 
economically disadvantaged parts of the UK. Retaining 
a strong presence in the North of England and Scotland 
also has a positive impact on service personnel who are 
disproportionately drawn from these areas and who 
are therefore able to benefit from the sorts of support 
extended families and networks of friends are able to 
provide. 
 
Conclusion
The Government’s commitment to the Military 
Covenant and improving the conditions for service 
personnel is to be welcomed, although it is notable 
that the Government has not specifically endorsed or 
supported aspects of the Military Covenant Commission’s 
work, nor has it chosen – at this stage – to enshrine the 
covenant in law. The Government’s stated preference 
to include a provision in the Armed Forces Act for the 
Secretary of State to provide an annual report on how 
the covenant has been observed in Government for the 
previous year. Although this is a weak measure, which 
avoids the need to work out and establish what factors 
are to be included in a legally enforceable covenant, 
it does establish – in the popular media and societal 
consciousness - a general duty of care by which the 
Government can be measured and judged. Evidence from 
serving officers was that there was an expectation that 
the covenant would be brought into statute in some way. 
Service charities have also criticised the Government for 
failing to follow up on what they had indicated would be 
a legal obligation.26
26  Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Royal British Legion condemns military covenant U-turn’, The Guardian, (15 March 2011).
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The review team believe the commitment to military 
personnel should run on a ‘through-life’ basis from the 
point of recruitment to the individual’s post-service life. 
This commitment should include education towards 
life skills (including financial skills), towards vocational 
training, and a commitment to buying in services 
from ex-service personnel in their civilian lives. This 
commitment to the individual should also apply to 
their spouse and children who provide so much of the 
moral support required for a soldier, airman or sailor to 
discharge their duties effectively. 
The Government (and nation) owes servicemen and 
women a greater duty of care in providing them with the 
skills and opportunities to reintegrate into civilian life 
and to do so in a way that will allow them a good quality 
of life. To this end the HERO Review has proposed 
various means by which service personnel (and reservists) 
could be up-skilled during their service to the nation, 
encouraged out on industry placements, and guaranteed 
post-service employment in a way that adds flexibility 
to the division between regular, reserve and civilian 
life. There should also be additional financial help and 
mentoring to put service personnel on a sounder financial 
footing for when they leave the armed forces, including in 
the ownership of property, which is discussed later in the 
report.
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The question of finance has dominated the political 
and media agenda since the banking crisis began in 2008. 
The British Government’s de-facto nationalisation of 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock and Lloyds 
Group, the policy of ‘quantitative easing’ (introducing 
new money into the economy) and a downturn in 
the British economy (including a large number of 
job losses across the private sector) resulting in a 
reduction in the Government tax take from personal and 
corporate taxation introduced a structural deficit to the 
Government’s accounts. This structural deficit and its 
public policy implications will have a large effect on any 
future financial decision-making affecting the defence 
estate. 
Abstract 
The funding of the defence estate represents a major challenge in the context of lowering 
Government expenditure and the need to manage resources more effectively, some of the primary 
drivers behind the SDSR. Future developments in the management and operation of DE resources 
will need fully to recognise the effects of reduced funding. The significance of the reduced funding 
will manifest itself on both the operational side of the DE and also on the management and 
deployment of capital resources for planned and future investment programmes and specifically 
major capital projects.
With this in mind, the HERO Review team has examined the funding of major capital projects, 
and also provided an analysis of the major approaches available to the Government in the funding 
of future Defence Estate capital projects. For the sake of clarity, the review has assessed the 
funding approaches in the context of private funding and investment and specifically the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), and in turn assessed the potential alternatives that may be available in the 
foreseeable future.
 
Since the 1990’s the use of private finance in public sector procurement has steadily risen. 
There have been many success stories arising from use of private finance in a range of differing 
sectors with fixed price contracts, high performance standards and an ongoing commitment to 
asset management as being key tenets. At the same time, there has been an ongoing debate with 
regards to the achievement of value for money and the satisfaction of affordability constraints and, 
particularly in MoD, flexibility and the ability to respond to change over a typical 25/30 year PFI 
contract. Such a debate has come to the fore given the current Government funding constraints, 
but it is also worth bearing in mind that the PFI was born out of the climate of Government 
funding constraints in the 1990’s and the desire to increase private sector skills and techniques in 
the Government sector.
 The coalition Government is currently reviewing the use of private finance, in the context 
of sustained Parliamentary and media criticisms, considering whether or not such finance is 
affordable in the context of significant Government expenditure reductions. Notwithstanding this, 
at the same time, other forms of funding and structures are being developed that place emphasis 
on localism and the interests of multiple stakeholders, but very much involve private finance and 
private skills and techniques, such as Local Asset Backed Vehicle (LABV) structures, Total Place 
(active estates management), Community Budgets with a focus on long term efficiency gains and 
spend to save initiatives. Moving forward, it is likely that the Government will still require private 
sector involvement but that the form and structure of their involvement will vary from project to 
project on a case-by-case basis. 
Chapter Two: Financing the Defence Estate
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Current Observations
The defence estate as a whole represents a diverse 
set of real-estate holdings. This diversity does however 
present both opportunities and challenges to organisations 
representing the private sector. At the same time, it also 
represents a challenge in relation to whether the estate is 
assessed as either a whole, or on a site by site basis and 
how this feeds into the creation of value for the MoD. 
 
There is also a geographical dimension in relation to 
the creation of value, in so far as this is driven by land 
and property values. For example, significant elements 
of the estate are located in areas reflecting both history 
and military deployment and so the disposal of elements 
of the defence estate, say outside of London, is, in the 
short to medium term, unlikely to yield market value and 
so is likely to be less attractive to private sector partners. 
The major banks are currently retaining their land-banks, 
and the investment market (such as it is) is waiting for 
the release of these holdings. This twin-dynamic of both 
banks and investors holding off entering the market, 
would make it untimely to dispose of large sections of 
the defence estate. Interview evidence collected by the 
research team suggests that except for some targeted sites 
that offer significant disposal value such as in the centre 
of London, little interest exists for disposals. (An example 
would be the Hyde Park barracks, which it is understood 
is currently under discussion for disposal.) In light of 
this, review team believe that the primary focus of DE 
and its successor organisation should be on actively and 
efficiently managing its portfolio of sites and assets rather 
than simply running a major programme of disposals 
which, if undertaken in conjunction with the rest of the 
public sector, has the potential to overload the market 
with public sector assets. 
Such an approach would also be consistent with 
the requirement to retain ownership and management 
of certain elements of the defence estate which are, 
for reasons of national security, less receptive to the 
involvement of private sector partners, such as Porton 
Down, Faslane and Aldermaston. In many ways this 
has already been attempted through the Project MoDel 
exercise, whereby sites have been sold and others 
redeveloped within North West London and straight 
sales to market have been made or may be planned in the 
South East since 2006, and in the context the Allenby-
Connaught accommodation project PFI signed in March 
2006 (see further below). Bases such as Lossiemouth 
may well have little intrinsic monetary value (aside from 
their economic regenerative contribution to Scotland), 
and therefore would be better served by a change or 
adaptation of use, than disposal.
Additionally, it is worth bearing in mind that it may 
be possible to look at transferring relevant elements 
of the estate into a property vehicle or fund such that 
value could be generated and private sector skills and 
expertise applied in the management of properties. The 
Review Team concluded that a more realistic prospect 
for the marketisation of the defence estate was that 
elements of the estate are transferred into appropriate 
‘fund of funds’. Other central Government departments 
have already participated in comparable arrangements 
since early 2000, such as the DWP with Trillium, 
which transferred the management of properties to 
the private sector partner over a 20-year period. To 
put this into further relevant context the Single Living 
Accommodation provision could be moved into large 
scale funds that hold student accommodation across the 
UK, and family accommodation could be moved into 
residential holdings funds, thus injecting private capital 
into these areas, removing the risk (and the management) 
from the public sector, but having to share any profits 
with private investors. Such findings might be politically 
controversial, as they necessarily transfer public land 
and assets into offshore financial vehicles, some of which 
have attracted negative publicity recently. The HERO 
Review team found strong indications that private sector 
partners, investors and managers were likely to find these 
propositions attractive if they were able to manage the 
properties without excessive Government hindrance. 
It was reported to the team that the amount of ‘serious’ 
investment activity (those with a capitalisation of in 
excess of £100m) in real estates in the UK was coming 
almost exclusively from sovereign wealth funds, and not 
from indigenous UK investors. It was similarly reported 
that sovereign wealth funds tended to want to invest in 
London primarily, and were really looking to invest in 
iconic property holdings - partly a prestige issue, and 
partly a previous performance issue. The team was 
told by a number of respondents that it was ‘extremely 
unlikely’ that such investors would be prepared to look 
outside of London. If correct this narrows the options 
for disposal to a few remaining iconic buildings in 
London, such as the Hyde Park barracks, which the 
team understands is already earmarked for disposal. The 
major banking groups have also now reduced the level of 
their investments to around £40million for any individual 
investment, meaning that for large capital projects 
consortia are currently the norm. 
Finally, aside from the development of what are 
essentially residential based activities, opportunities for 
value creation may arise from changing the land use of 
existing sites to that suitable for energy and infrastructure 
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uses and the Review Team found a more enthusiastic 
attitude for the idea of encouraging private money into 
the defence estate through these means. For example, 
and this hinges on location, some sites if brown-field in 
nature could be used to site the next generation of power 
stations, to site carbon capture facilities, energy from 
waste technologies, or to onshore process North Sea oil 
and gas materials.27 Similarly it is possible to place key 
infrastructure goods, within infrastructure investment 
funds, which may similarly provide some external funding 
for the Exchequer. The potential and role of infrastructure 
investment funds are discussed later in the utilisation 
section. 
Financing Structures: 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) & Public 
Finance Initiatives (PFI)
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) which was 
established by central Government in 1992/1993, 
represent formal collaborative approaches between public 
bodies, local authorities or central Government and 
private sector partners aimed at providing operational 
services and capital projects. Such partnerships range 
from FM contracts, such as cleaning and providing 
canteen food, to those involving more substantial long-
term investments. PFI has been widely used across 
Government departments: health, education and defence 
have all been substantial users of these financial tools.
 
Generally speaking, PFI schemes provide a mechanism 
or framework by which public services can receive the 
benefits of contractual services provided by a private 
sector partner, also providing finance, on the basis of 
a long-term funding contract. To date, the MoD has 
favoured the use of private finance initiatives and in 2008 
it was responsible for 17.6% of Government privately 
financed contracts; behind only Transport (26.4%) 
and Health (19.8%), spending over £1bn in that year. 
The heavy use of PFI financing was consistent with 
Government policy at that time, and the long-term 
contract periods and accounting treatment allowed for 
significant growth in this area. Some of the benefits of 
these approaches has been the provision of certainty 
on pricing, (particularly relevant as traditional forms of 
public sector procurement had notably failed to manage 
construction works prices), the provision of whole-life 
costing and asset management, all underpinned by the 
concept of risk transfer and the management of risk by 
parties best placed to manage it. Again, as of now, this 
was with the backdrop of the recession in the 1990’s and 
Government spending constraints. 
There has though been sustained criticism of these 
financing methods in Parliament and the media, focusing 
on the overall cost of these contracts, whether risk is 
actually shifted to the private sector partner, and the 
individual unit costs of items within PFI contracts. 
The cumulative effect of these criticisms has been to 
make the future of PFI very uncertain. The Prime 
Minister himself has pledged to establish a review of PFI 
contracts, and interview evidence collected by the team 
suggests that there is a moratorium on new PFI contracts 
within Government, which is partly political and partly 
financially based.28 The HERO Review team found that 
with any defence estate project (and the same might be 
said for any large Government project), the key element 
to understanding the viability of such a project or the 
dynamics within it, is its financing. As with traditional 
exchequer based Government funding, private finance is 
also subject to the pressures generated by the economic 
cycle, so at the moment the low-risk models that the 
banking groups who supply PFI are working to mean that 
lending rates are running at 2% above inflation (so around 
5.5%) whereas during the era of economic plenty (1996-
2007) they lent at 0.5% above inflation, which would 
now be 4%, but typically would have placed financing at 
2.5% (which is a historically low figure). 
Not only is there a risk based premium on lending 
currently, the freedom at which banks are lending even at 
the inflated level has been restricted to around £40million 
per individual banking source, which inevitably means 
financing via a consortium. Private funding of this sort 
typically forms 90% of the external funding for any PFI 
project with the contractor (or consortia) providing the 
10% in equity funding themselves.29 It might appear that 
it is the banks and funding groups who have the most 
to lose in these arrangements, but it is the contractors 
that lose their ten percent first, before the bank’s money 
can be touched, so current risk based financing of 2% 
above inflation seems prohibitively cautious, making 
Government projects funded in this way open to the 
charge of being over-priced. PFI is thought to be 
moving towards a standardised system of contracts. This 
derives from cost cutting needs and to make finance less 
complicated and problematic, since it allows the banking 
groups to assess the risk of a project in more detail. Such 
a drop in uncertainty should allow for better financial 
terms. 
27 Although this arguably may conflict with current Treasury rules on the use of Government estates.
28 It should be noted, however, that according to one news report the coalition Government has signed 61 PFIs with a value of £6.9bn since coming 
into office, of which 40 projects worth £3.74bn will complete in 2011. The review team is not able to corroborate these figures. Channel Four 
News, Coalition continues with ‘discredited’ PFI scheme, 18 April 2011, http://www.channel4.com/news/coalition-increases-discredited-pfi-
schemes, accessed 18 April 2011. 
29 National Audit Office, Financing PFI projects in the credit crisis and the Treasury’s response, (27 July 2010). 
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At the same time, PPP/PFI arrangements have also 
attracted criticism for being both expensive and lacking 
in flexibility. The review team found that much of 
such inflexibility comes in the negotiations (and then 
delivery) of the financing. Any change to the financing 
contract (based on individual banks specifications for 
lending), or the project specification, involves altering 
the theoretical risks of the project. Consequently banks 
are resistant to contract re-negotiations and effectively 
impose transaction cost penalties for doing so (once a 
financing contract changes it is as if starting again, which 
incurs heavy legal bills to all parties: the Government 
and the PSP, the PSP and their banks, the PSP and 
their various subcontractors), and whilst it is possible for 
banks to assume more risk they pass on that burden to all 
the contracting parties. Each of these contract changes 
requires two sets of lawyers and consultants and in this 
way PFIs are indeed quite inflexible and expensive to 
change. 
The standard term of a PFI is 25 years, making 
them unsuitable for projects that are likely to change 
repeatedly in size and scale over that time period. The 
review team was told that some projects had attracted 
financing interest rates of up to 30%, which makes 
them economically and politically untenable. A curious 
attitude towards risk can be found in the banks’ attitude 
towards PFI projects, which is that they should be the 
lowest form of risk investment for the banks, a ‘sure 
return’. But this logic also pulls PFI projects down the line 
of being locked into one particular type of activity, or one 
particular use for the life of the project, for the reason that 
changed use alters the risk profile and enters uncertainty 
(and therefore risk premiums into the financing). For 
future defence projects that may look at a dual use, or 
alteration to a civilian use within the life-time of the 
PFI, a PFI contract is not going to be an economically 
attractive option, even within some forms of staged PFI 
deal that allow variations at marked points throughout the 
contract. In short, for PFIs to be economically attractive 
the terms have to remain stable throughout the contract. 
There is one caveat to this, known as the Innisfree 
windfall. Prior to build completion, risk in PFIs is high, 
and therefore financing is only available at higher interest 
rates. PFIs are usually refinanced after a successful build 
to take advantage of lower interest rates. The difference 
between the costs of these two loans is what is known 
as the Innisfree windfall, which was worth hundreds of 
millions of pounds. It should also be noted that since this 
windfall, this kind of refinancing has been covered by 
profit sharing agreements between public bodies and their 
PSPs.
In relation to cost and value for money, is has been 
difficult unequivocally to demonstrate whether the 
partnerships are more expensive or not, irrespective of the 
number of projects reviewed and the issue of flexibility is 
directly related to the certainty that the arrangements can 
bring. The greater the flexibility the less certainty we will 
have and over a long-term time horizon, it is on balance, 
in the interests of all participants to have greater certainty 
on service outcomes and cost. 
The MoD presents an interesting dilemma, on the one 
hand, because of its shifting operational and capability 
requirements it requires significant flexibility, but on the 
other hand it has significant equipment and fixed asset 
requirements that cannot simply be met from annual 
resources and are suited to bring funded over longer time 
horizons. Of course, unlike residential accommodation, 
which may have an alternative use, if so required, military 
assets and hardware are not easily transferable, or likely 
to create value if sold, to a private sector partner or third 
party. The problem of incorporating the ability to change 
direction in the middle of a substantial capital programme 
is not unique to PFI (as the recent inability to reverse 
out of the commitments in the aircraft carrier contracts 
has shown). However, these challenges are not always 
insurmountable and it should be possible to engage with 
private sector partners on a shorter-term basis and/or 
identify a commercial-risk structure that better satisfies 
operational requirements on a case by case basis. 
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MoD Accommodation – Relevant Case Studies
As previously mentioned, the MoD has entered into a 
number of successful PPP projects involving the private 
sector. Such projects include:
•	 Project MoDEL; and
•	 Allenby – Connaught.
Further details are provided below in relation to the 
above-mentioned projects.
Project MoDEL
•	 Project MoDEL is a rationalisation of the MoD’s estate in two separate contracts, consolidating the 
facilities occupied by UK forces on several North West London sites onto a modern, integrated, fit-for-
purpose site at RAF Northolt.
•	 MoDEL will initially invest around £180m in the re-development of RAF Northolt and will also free up 
some 100 hectares of brownfield land through the disposal of surplus sites in Greater London. This has 
supported the availability of new homes in the London area.
•	 For the larger contract VSM Estates Ltd, a consortium of VINCI PLC and St Modwen Properties PLC 
was awarded the contract to redevelop RAF Northolt and dispose of surplus sites.
•	 Bovis Lend Lease was awarded the smaller contract, which involves the construction and relocation of 
the British Forces Post Office (BFPO) operational facility to RAF Northolt from its current home at Inglis 
Barracks in Mill Hill.
•	 The MoDEL contract was procured using Prime Plus Contracting (PPC) methodology. Prime Plus 
Contracting is seen as an innovative means of funding a high profile property project and uses the value of 
the sites that are to be disposed of to fund construction costs.
Source: MoD - Defence Estates
Allenby - Connaught
•	 Project Allenby/Connaught is a 35-year contract (March 2006 – April 2041) for the building, refurbish-
ment, management and operation of living and working accommodation and facilities for 18,700 military 
and civilian staff at Aldershot and five garrisons on Salisbury Plain.
•	 Aspire Defence Holdings Ltd is a Special Purpose Vehicle set up specifically for the project and brings 
together Carillion and Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) in a consortium. Carillion owns 50%, KBR 45% 
and HSBC 5%. 
•	 Construction lasting 8 years building 11,500 new en-suite single rooms.
•	 Valued at £8 billion it is the largest PFI estates project undertaken by the MoD.30
•	 316 new or refurbished buildings have been handed over to the MoD so far
•	 Over 5,500 soldiers are now living in the new en-suite accommodation.
•	 Aspire Defence is delivering on average over one new building every week and will continue to do so for 
the duration of the eight year construction programme.
•	 Following the construction phases these buildings are handed over to Aspire Defence Services Ltd (ADSL) 
for the remainder of the 35 year contract. ADSL maintains and supports them from fitting them out with 
furniture to carrying out the everyday repairs and supply of utilities.
•	 98.4% of the 69,500 annual calls (2009) to the 24/7 help desk were answered within 30 seconds.
•	 50% of routine maintenance requests are completed in 10-15 days instead of the contractual 40 days.
Source: Miscellaneous
30 OGC, “Defence Construction in the Built Environment – Project Allenby/Connaught” 2006
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With the example of these two successful projects it is 
important to recognise that the MoD has already made 
substantial efforts to improve its estate and that such 
projects should provide a solid foundation of experience 
and learning for the new financial challenges that lie 
ahead. Of course, any lessons applicable from these 
projects will need to be recognised and factored into any 
future arrangements that are put in place. 
 
Localism, Local Asset Backed Vehicles (LAB-
Vs), Land Swaps and NHS LIFT
The Government has committed to devolving powers 
to a local level (its Big Society initiative) and engaging 
with the private and charitable sectors to improve 
efficiency and quality of services within the context of 
spending constraints imposed by CSR. 
The Localism Agenda
Localism, enshrined within the Localism Bill, 
constitutes a radical shift of power from the centralised 
state to local communities, it removes Regional 
Development Agencies as the primary driver for 
investment in a geographical area, reforms the planning 
process and creates Local Enterprise Partnerships which 
can take on a diverse range of roles and are intended 
to drive local private sector led growth. The review’s 
interview evidence suggests that the reforms to the 
planning system are likely to produce some positive 
results that are responsive to the needs of any given 
population and it will allow defence contractors to 
negotiate with individual local authorities, rather than 
having to navigate a regional hub, with its own agenda. 
The HERO Review team remains unconvinced: there 
are myriad examples of where regional development 
agencies have delivered strong internal investment and 
employment to their regions. Local Authorities have been 
profoundly impacted by CSR, they are being tasked with 
driving 28% savings over the next 4 year period which 
CSR covers. 
More collaborative working with a focus on shared 
services, flexibility, compromise and innovation is now 
at the top of the agenda for all public sector bodies. 
Local Authorities are becoming far more commercially 
astute and the Coalition Government is intent on giving 
them the powers to act independently for local interests. 
Localism will give Local Authorities the power to do 
things differently, they will be able to behave more like 
businesses and generate income – and this is already 
happening, Kent County Council now sells electricity 
and legal services to other Councils throughout the 
country. What is clear is that there are likely to be fewer 
of the national “one size fits all” spending programmes 
prevalent during the last decade - everything will need to 
be considered in the local context on a case by case basis. 
A key challenge - but also a potential source of 
opportunity for the MoD - is how it will engage with 
Localism and whether this will in turn create a greater 
potential to engage with local authorities and other 
important stakeholders in any local area. Where the MoD 
has large garrisons there is clearly the potential to pool, 
align and share with these bodies and organisations in 
appropriate circumstances through a form of localised 
agreement. The political will in 2011 for partnership 
arrangements is very strong. The mooted reforms to 
the public sector, and the re-writing of the Treasury’s 
‘Green Book’ of rules dictating what public assets can 
be used for, means there is now the possibility for all the 
defence sites which would be difficult to sell – because 
they remain underdeveloped – to be leveraged in 
conjunction with local authorities, commercial partners 
or communities in a ‘big society’ model. This would help 
the MoD make better use of land than simply disposing 
of it, as it could reasonably demonstrate that it was being 
utilised. The British Army’s return from the Rhine (and 
its £700m footprint) may also improve the MoD’s relative 
bargaining power with local authorities when it seeks to 
relocate its returning military. In leveraging its ’buying 
power’ it could potentially choose a local authority 
partner to create a mixed use garrison community with 
a particular set of emphases (such as combating anti-
social behaviour), which would incentivise the mixing 
of military and civilian communities and reduce the 
emphasis on assets that are inside or outside ‘the wire’. 
There are a number of commercial models and 
structures; some well established others more recent and 
untested, which are well suited to fit individual local 
circumstances and the bespoke needs of individual public 
sector bodies and organisations. The study has focussed 
on three of these models, Local Asset Backed Vehicles, 
Land Swaps and NHS LIFT.
Local Asset Backed Vehicles (LABV)
An increasing number of LABVs have been coming 
to the market. It is seen as an alternative to a traditional 
disposal for holders of assets who wish to unlock value 
in their portfolio. This value can then be used to help 
drive regeneration programmes. Under the structure the 
local or public authority enters into a 50:50 joint venture 
developer arrangement with private sector partners. The 
joint venture approach does expose the public authority 
to some risk, but it also requires a level of commitment, 
which, allied with private sector skills and techniques, 
has the potential to also provide better value for money 
through a truly collaborative approach.
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At a basic level, the public authority commits public 
assets, typically land and buildings – into the LABV 
structures, and the private sector partners provide 
resources, working and risk capital to develop the 
assets and share the profit created. In turn, both parties 
are beneficiaries of the value generated: LABVs can 
be utilised to develop sites of low cost or profitability, 
however, to remain attractive to private partners they 
require high value sites to be included as well. A example 
of a LABV is that being undertaken by Bournemouth 
Borough Council and Morgan Sindall which reached 
financial close in February this year. The scheme is 
centred on sixteen sites within Bournemouth’s town 
centre. It is intended that all sixteen sites will be 
redeveloped between now and 2025, with the possibility 
of more sites being included at a later stage. The nature 
of the developments is varied, ranging from private 
residential, affordable housing, commercial, students’ 
accommodation, leisure and cinemas. 
Master plan image of the proposed Bournemouth 
LABV scheme:
 
Another example can be found via the waterfront 
development in Portsmouth: both schemes used the 
valuable assets of relatively cash-poor local authorities 
to harness valuable developments, something that could 
apply to the defence estate in the post-SDSR future. 
It may also be important to the MoD that within this 
model local authorities remain in strategic control of 
the contract, and therefore over publicly owned assets. 
The LABV also allows for the development of portfolios 
of property within a contract (something akin to the 
balancing off of an investment portfolio), which would 
allow the MoD to pair up its premium assets with its 
commercially less attractive holdings. The defence 
estate with its broad geographical spread is particularly 
well placed to take advantage of this feature. The key 
to successful LABV contracts, however, is cooperative 
working conditions between the public authority and 
the private contractor, so it would be imperative that in 
the defence context the MoD ceded some of its control 
The HERO Review: Harnessing Efficiencies, Rethinking Outcomes The Future of the Defence Estate28
to the private sphere. Nevertheless, another key feature 
of the approach, and this would also be important to 
the MoD, is that the public authorities retain a level 
of strategic control over the development company. 
Requirements change over time and the LABVs strategy 
can be re-evaluated to meet the changing operational 
and deployment needs of the partners. 
Land Swaps 
There is nothing new in land swaps. There have 
been many examples of this in the UK, and the MoD 
has been at the forefront of this activity with Project 
MoDEL. For example, with Project MoDEL land was 
traded to a private sector partner and circa £180m in 
new investment was received in the redevelopment of 
existing retained bases, with the sites no longer required 
being sold for housing redevelopments in areas where 
housing shortages are severe. Land swaps can address 
the problems of lack of funds and a desire to transfer risk: 
two prescient factors in today’s public sector. Existing 
examples of this model have had the following features: a 
local authority with no ready access to capital funds for 
new build works – their asset value being locked up in 
the surplus land. A private sector provider stepping in to 
forward fund a facility, taking on the risk of borrowing 
development finance and implementing design and 
build works. The commercial structures including a 
market tested land value, an overage mechanism on the 
residential land and an underage mechanism on the 
development costs. 
Local Improvement Finance 
Trust - LIFT 
Local Improvement Finance 
Trust (LIFT) is a well established 
procurement structure in the NHS 
which could be adapted for use in the 
defence estate. Typically, a PPP joint 
venture is set up which is jointly owned 
by the local PCT, Central Government 
and the Private Sector, but has not yet 
been established in the defence sector. 
There are some important differences 
with most other schemes, the most 
important being that the shareholders or 
owners are all stakeholders. 
Below – the contract structure for the 
Islington school land swap
Above – the Islington design showing 
the school and the residential 
development which funded it
Development  
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Sub-sale of  
Ecclesbourne site
Affordable housing  
agreementBluestone building 
contract
Durkan building  
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Collateral  
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Performance 
bond
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MS plc 
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Bluestone Howarth Durkan
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A LIFT company is established with a combination 
of the interested parties, in this case the local NHS 
organisation (Primary Care Trust and typically at a 20% 
level), Partnership UK and the private sector partners 
(typically at a 80% level) all as shareholders. This joint 
venture (JV) takes the form of a limited company. Known 
as the LIFTco, it owns and maintains the buildings it 
develops and leases the premises to local healthcare 
provides (like hospitals, GPs, dentists, pharmacies, 
libraries and so on). Many of the facilities that have been 
developed are genuine multi agency providing a broad 
spectrum of services to the public. The LIFT co procures 
the FM services (including cleaning, security, catering 
and portering), carries out estate management and 
rationalisation programmes and can potentially disposal 
of existing assets that are no longer required. This 
elimination of interfaces between service providers has 
generally been both cost and operationally efficient, and 
it also fits into the DE’s desire to recreate itself as a ‘thin 
client’ between private sector providers and end-user 
clients. Residual Vvalue in the assets, which are created 
means that the funding is cheaper for the client during 
the contract term (usually 25 years). As these assets 
tend to factor in future residual values then they can 
also potentially provide further value once the contracts 
expire. 
Through its shareholding in the LiftCo the public 
sector shares in the profits from debt refinancing with 
the private sector. The Strategic Partnering Agreement 
underpinning the structure can provide well thought 
out and effective governance structures which have 
led to genuine multi-agency planning, utilisation and 
integration of existing estate and developments across 
communities, something that a good number of the 
review’s interviewees suggested was needed in the 
defence estate. 
The Outside Options: Mutualisation and  
Community Land Trusts
The aim of ‘mutuality’ is to give employees a stake in 
their organisation with the aim of producing a motivated 
workforce inspired to generate larger profits. Well-known 
examples of this kind of business model include John 
Lewis and the Co-operative group, but more specialist 
firms have adopted the model too. Consultants such as 
Arup, Mott MacDonald and Turley Associates all use 
some form of shared employee ownership. 31
31 Government hopes to benefit from mutualisation, Property Week, 5 Nov 2010
32 Editorial (1 December 2009) A Mutual Moment, Progress, 1 Dec 2009 http://progressonline.org.uk/articles/article.asp?a=4995
33 Cabinet Office (10 November 2010) Francis Maude Launches Pathfinder Mutuals 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2010/100812-pathfinder-mutuals.aspx
34 http://www.respublica.org.uk/category/keywords/mutualism
35 http://www.caledonia.org.uk/papers/Mutualising%20The%20State.pdf
36 http://www.policy-network.net/articles_detail.aspx?ID=3902
37 Housing & Regeneration Act 2008, Part 2, Chapter 1, Clause 79
38 Department for Communities and Local Government, Report of the Shared Equity Task Force December 2006; Community Land Trusts: A 
consultation, October 2008.
In June 2008, a Conservative Party policy green 
paper (A Stronger Society: Voluntary Action in the 
21st Century) called for Government to “promote co-
operatives and mutualisation as a way of transferring 
public assets and revenue streams to the voluntary 
sector”, this then paved the way for what is now known 
as ‘the big society’. The former Labour Minister, Tessa 
Jowell MP, has also repeatedly called for mutualisation 
in various sectors; from social care to the BBC and 
local services.32 On 12 August 2010 the Cabinet Office 
minister, Francis Maude, launched a series of path finding 
mutuals.33 Numerous think tanks such as Res Publica,34 
the New Economic Foundation,35 and Policy network36 
have also carried out work into mutualism. Much of the 
defence estate will remain unsuitable for this kind of 
structure, but it may be possible for assets that benefit 
service families to be held in this way. This will turn 
on the extent of the Government’s commitment to the 
through Government delivery of the Military Covenant, 
which is discussed separately. 
Community Land Trusts
The concept of a Community Land Trust was brought 
into legal force in the UK by the Housing & Regeneration 
Act 2008. The basic premise being that:
A Community Land Trust (CLT) is a 
local community-controlled organisation 
set up to own and manage land and other 
assets in perpetuity for the benefit of 
the community. The assets other than 
land may be, for example, affordable 
housing, workspaces, agricultural facilities, 
commercial outlets, or community 
facilities.37
CLTs were suggested as a possible model for delivering 
affordable housing in the previous Government’s Housing 
Green Paper, Homes for the Future: more affordable, more 
sustainable (July 2007). The potential benefits of CLTs 
were also acknowledged by the Government in the 
report of the Shared Equity Task Force.38 As a model 
of ownership, the CLT is a model of affordable housing 
and community development that has slowly spread 
throughout the United States during the past 40 years. 
CLTs work by enabling occupiers to pay for the use of 
buildings and services at prices they can afford, while the 
value of land, subsidies, planning gain and other equity 
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benefits are permanently locked in, on behalf of them and 
future occupiers, by the Community Land Trust. 
A National Demonstration Programme was run from 
2006 until 2008 to develop CLTs as a mechanism 
through which to develop affordable housing. Specialised 
funding has since been developed through the CLT Fund 
run by several charitable and ethical investors and the 
use of the model has spread to all parts of England and 
Wales as local communities seek a model which can 
help them overcome the challenges specific to their local 
context.39 There is no requirement to register CLTs and 
so the Government has no readily available figures on 
how many exist nor how many homes such schemes will 
provide.40 The CLT might be one route by which service 
personnel could be encouraged onto the property ladder, 
but as a practical preference this report recommends 
an endowment fund that frees service personnel from 
needing to be tied to one particular property while in 
service, and allows them to buy on the open market 
once that have left active service. Unless a cross-service 
CLT was to be established (which would be difficult 
given the disposal of family homes in the 1990s out of 
MoD ownership) personnel would always be tied to 
one particular property. CLTs remain an interesting 
proposition in the wider community however. 
Conclusion 
The current public spending constraints represent a 
major challenge for the MoD for the foreseeable future 
and the management and operation of DE/DIO will need 
to fully recognise and adapt to the new environment 
in which it finds itself. The significance of the reduced 
funding will manifest itself on both the operational side of 
the DE/DIO and also the management and deployment 
of capital resources for planned and future investment 
programme. 
Although the UK Government is primarily funded 
by public sector resources, the use of private finance 
has risen significantly. There have been many success 
stories arising from use of private finance in a range 
of differing sectors with fixed price contracts, high 
performance standards and an ongoing commitment to 
asset management being key features. At the same time, 
questions remain with regards to the achievement of 
VFM and the satisfaction of affordability constraints and 
such debates have come to the fore in the wake of the 
CSR. The HERO Review team nevertheless believes 
that the involvement of the private sector and attendant 
funding is likely to remain, but that the structures will 
be dependent upon the values that can be created from 
existing assets and the management skills required to 
produce value. A one size fits all procurement model 
handed down from Central Government will not be 
appropriate and projects will need to be structured to take 
account of their individual circumstances on a case by 
case basis - private finance structure, LABVs, land swaps 
and strategic partnerships such as NHS LIFT all need to 
receive serious consideration.
Such structures place an emphasis on localism and 
the interests of multiple stakeholders and seek to take 
maximum benefit from private sector skills and know 
how. As well as generating much needed value, such 
approaches and structures could also allow for greater 
flexibility over the medium to long term and might 
evolve to meet the MoD’s operational and deployment 
requirements as they change over time. For such 
arrangements to be successful there needs to be genuine 
partnership between the MoD and the private sector 
providers - all the evidence obtained by this review 
suggests that it is only through genuine partnership and a 
joint venture approach that these projects succeed.
It is unlikely given the current political climate that 
‘traditional’ PFI deals will form a significant quantity of 
the financing for DE/DIO capital projects going forward. 
They are too inflexible over the life of many projects, too 
burdensome at the tendering stage and now problematic 
to fund via banking groups, which have become 
prohibitively cautious. LABV and LIFT structures 
appear to offer the best opportunities for defence estate 
funding in the medium term. They offer the flexibility 
and partnership arrangements that the review team 
believe will be crucial to the future of the estates, and the 
changing operational environment the armed forces and 
its personnel will be confronted with until 2020. 
LABV, LIFT and Land Swap arrangements might 
allow for the introduction of new assets to the defence 
estate, whilst disposing of excess assets, something the 
DE/DIO is keen to achieve, and something the team 
believes is necessary for them to do in order to meet the 
operational flexibility demanded going forward. In this 
context the Treasury’s desire for capital receipts, without 
inward investment into the DE, is and has been unhelpful. 
The Localism Bill, and the political signals surrounding 
it, opens up some interesting possibilities for the DE/DIO 
and its private sector partners. A key part of the future 
mix of defence estate provision will come through these 
local partnerships. Finally, the review team think that 
there is scope to marketise aspects of the defence estate, 
such as the core infrastructure, via specific funds offered 
by private finance groups. 
39 http://www.communitylandtrusts.org.uk/?s=15
40 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100706/text/100706w0001.htm
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Utilisation
One of the major areas of underdeveloped thinking 
within the defence estate community (and the team 
know that the DE has been working on this subject) is 
the utilisation of various parts of the estate. Those who 
have worked in this area told the team that the major 
barriers to utilising the defence estate were established 
Treasury rules (the so-called ‘Green Book’)41 which states 
that the defence estate may only be used for defence 
purposes, and that if a section of the estate becomes 
surplus to requirements it must be disposed of, regardless 
of any potential future use it may have. Furthermore, to 
avoid being forced to dispose of land, any future use must 
have already been envisaged. There is also an internal 
MoD push factor to dispose of excess land, because all 
land carries a risk factor and therefore potential costs 
to already tight departmental budgets. Many of those 
interviewed by the HERO Review team suggested that 
it was the Treasury’s rules about land-use (as enshrined 
in the so-called ‘Green Book’) that is the main barrier to 
the effective rationalisation, utilisation and exploitation of 
value in the defence estate. However, evidence collected 
from Treasury officials strongly suggests that these rules 
may well be relaxed – probably by mid-2011 – which 
would dramatically change this picture and free up public 
authorities to make greater use of their assets. Given the 
scale of the savings the coalition Government needs to 
make to rectify the estimated £165bn structural deficit, 
the utilisation of the defence estate will not contribute a 
particularly significant amount to that end. What is clear, 
however, is that there is a political imperative to make 
these reforms, and to ‘mainstream’ this kind of utilisation 
and commercialisation within the public services. If fully 
realised, this transformative political agenda will have 
a lasting legacy on the defence community (as it will in 
other policy areas), eroding the conceptual and practical 
divisions between public and private sectors. 
The current Treasury rules are in place to protect the 
misapplication of public money for commercial ends. The 
rules are also designed to ensure that departments focus 
on the delivery of public goods, and not – as might be a 
danger in a less restrictive system – on running publicly 
funded businesses. While these are understandable 
objectives, the spirit of the age is precisely about 
connecting up the public and the private spheres, about 
reducing costs in the public sphere and making the best 
use of Government holdings to generate the maximum 
value for money. Existing Treasury rules are therefore in 
some ways out of step with the necessities of the current 
times. Treasury officials pointed towards a shift in the 
political emphasis in Whitehall, which would permit local 
authorities to directly liaise with departments of state – 
in other words it would allow departments such as the 
MoD greater access to direct negotiations with individual 
local authorities, a step-change from the Regional 
Development Agencies that came to dominate the control 
of inward investment of this kind. 
The HERO Review team came across many examples 
of where – with greater flexibility – elements of the 
defence estate could be given a measure of commercial 
use, which would make a small contribution to the 
running costs of the estate (either through cost savings 
or income generation) and which could contribute to an 
environment or sustainability agenda across Government. 
A specific example comes from the redevelopment of 
RAF Northolt. The RAF’s proposal – within a defence 
use context – was to rebuild the runway and thereafter to 
allow some commercial use from it, including a dedicated 
hangar for private aircraft, from which some commercial 
income would have been generated. This could have 
formed a reasonably standard arrangement across the 
defence estate, and one that was suggested to the review 
team – in another context – for sites in the North of 
Scotland. Treasury restrictions, however, prevented 
this proposal being brought on stream. There are some 
inequities within the existing rules however - regimental 
and mess funds for example can be bolstered by the small 
scale commercial activity of the NAAFI, and certain very 
small scale commercial activities on individual defence 
establishments, budgeted at local level. The review team 
noted, with some amusement, a breaking news story from 
India, where the armed services (as the tip of an iceberg) 
are alleged to have utilised some 8000 acres of land for 97 
golf courses and country clubs. The revenue from these 
Abstract 
Of the areas the HERO Review has touched upon, utilisation remains the one that the research 
team feels has the most potential to bring a great deal of added value to the Defence Estate. This 
section explores the various usages for the Defence Estate, including energy generation, waste 
disposal and dual-usage. The section then goes onto explore the disposal of Defence Estate assets, 
how lessons have been learned about disposing of assets in a way that adds value to the estates and 
the MoD. 
41 HM Treasury, The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf
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facilities (open to members of the defence community 
and some non-defence civilians) had allegedly been run 
through private regimental budgets, away from the prying 
eyes of the Government’s auditors – not a model that is 
to be recommended.42 The review team would though 
propose an appropriately wider application of the small 
scale British kind of commercialisation across the defence 
estate, as a matter of culture, as well as a contribution 
to the running costs. A positive example of this kind of 
utilisation can be found in the private defence sector, 
in Portsmouth, with BAE System’s utilisation of their 
facilities. In partnership with the defence community, 
BAE ensures that the dockyards and associated facilities 
are constantly in use, to maximise the value inherent in 
the assets. Such practices could usefully be employed – 
where appropriate - across the entire defence estate. 
Energy Production
A key area in which utilisation could occur on the 
defence estate is energy production. Allowing MoD 
land to be used for energy production would help to 
meet the Government’s key sustainability targets and 
reduce the running costs associated with buildings and 
facilities operated on that land. Energy generation and 
energy efficiency highlights the problems in the current 
management of the defence estate and the planning 
procedures that cover it. Developers interviewed for 
this project have drawn up plans for programmes, which 
maximise the energy output of a site with a mix of solar, 
thermal and wind generation capabilities at a number of 
stages in the life of a project delivery programme. The 
key to maximising energy efficiency on a project/military 
establishment is to adopt staging posts (over a number 
of years) and to feed the best technology available at the 
time into the project at each staging post, rather than 
having a technology requirement that is front loaded at 
the beginning of a project, and which becomes obsolete 
by the five or ten year staging post. This kind of blended 
approach matches up well to the new variants of PFI 
and alternative funding that are discussed in the funding 
section of this report, and are obviously not suitable 
for traditional PFI structures, which would require the 
technology to be specified at the outset. The HERO 
Review team did not find the DE particularly responsive 
to such ideas - wind farms on Scottish estates would be 
incompatible with the airfields these would inevitably 
be placed on the team was told. Far from this suggestion, 
four main types of energy production that may be 
applicable to the defence estate are listed below. 
Given the Treasury’s emphasis on partnerships, it 
is also significant to note that energy suppliers such as 
Dalkia and Cofely have drawn up what they describe as 
‘district energy projects’, and these would potentially be 
highly suitable for the MoD, as the defence estate has a 
number of large sites that could be seen as district sized. 
Moreover, the SFA – being such a large-scale enterprise 
– might also be ripe for pioneering the mass-roll out 
of solar panelling and other localised forms of energy 
generation. We now present these different types of 
energy production, in turn.
Photo Voltaic’s (PV)
PVs are a simple measure, more commonly known 
as solar panels, that are simple to install, and simple to 
operate. They return the investment required in them 
within eight to ten years. The cost of each roof is in the 
region of £7000 for a 2.1kWp capacity system. Crucially 
the PV units do not produce sufficient electricity to 
be a cheaper alternative to the current cost of buying 
the electricity from the grid alone. At current prices, 
which are obviously subject to change, they become 
economically viable with a subsidy from electricity 
generators or via Feed In Tariffs “FITs” schemes, where 
householders are paid for the renewable energy they 
generate. Solar energy, on a house-size scale, provides a 
useful supplement to ‘grid’ energy and helps move the 
housing or business unit towards an energy sustainable 
position. A lacuna in the 2008 Energy Act is that 
commercial size PV schemes receive a reduced subsidy – 
on a sliding scale – as one moves towards 5megawatt sites, 
which attracts no subsidy. A review being conducted 
by the Government, at the time of writing, may lead 
to a reduction in the level of subsidies for commercial 
scale installations. The political question for the viability 
of these schemes, going forward, is to what extent the 
Government (and departments looking to exploit these 
technologies) value the sustainability agenda over and 
above the pure economic considerations of renewable 
versus fossil fuel generated electricity. 
Combined Heat and Power
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants make use 
of the heat that is generated as a by-product of the 
generation of energy, to provide heat to facilities on a 
district wide level. In Scandinavia this has been used to 
heat local swimming pools, or industrial units, and in the 
summer to meet some district wide residential heating 
needs. For CHP plants to be efficient they require a 
constant off take for a base load of, for example, 35% of 
the heat they produce. 
CHP technology is difficult to retrospectively fit, so 
CHP units are almost always new facilities. CHP is 
rarely cost effective at less than one megawatt (whose 
construction costs are around £1m per megawatt, 
reducing to £500k per megawatt at over 3 megawatt 
size). The maintenance of these facilities incurs widely 
42 ‘Indian Army Land Being Used for Golf Courses’, Financial Times, (27 March 2011).
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different costs (with a rather high base cost of £6 per 
mega-watt-hour), depending on the technology deployed 
in the site. The Government has said that it is keen to 
support this kind of technology and at the time of writing 
it is reviewing the Renewable Heat Incentive scheme 
(RHI), which will judge the subsidies to be offered for 
each unit of heat produced. An early indication from 
the Secretary of State for the Environment in March 
2011 was that the incentives would be focussed on the 
residential sector for the first years of the revised scheme 
and would taper off during the life of the installation.43 
Industry insiders welcomed these indications as being 
helpful to the establishment of a widespread scheme. 
Again, with public authority collaboration being at heart 
of this Government’s agenda, the time is perhaps ripe for 
the MoD to lead with local authorities in utilising this 
sustainable form of energy provision.
Ground Source Heat Pumps/ Geothermal
Geothermal is heat that is derived from boreholes that 
are sunk deep under-ground, and which make use of the 
latent heat deep beneath the surface. Such technologies 
and approaches are only applicable for buildings that 
require large quantities of load grade heat, such as 
buildings with large atria or those that have large areas of 
under floor heating. The high cost of the boreholes and 
associated equipment to exploit the heat limits it appeal 
to all but larger building projects. Ground source heat 
pumps can be used on a smaller scale to supplement other 
forms of heating but in these scenarios are unlikely to 
be the primary source of heat. As with Combined Heat 
and Power (CHP) facilities, the Government’s 2011 
review into this area may well make investment in this 
technology more attractive.
Anaerobic Digestion
Anaerobic Digestion (AD) is the production of biogas 
from biodegradable waste such as household, industrial 
waste or wastewater sludge. The efficiency of these 
methods is a function of the material used with higher 
fat contents being more productive in terms of producing 
burnable gas. The biogas can be burnt in a generator 
to produce electricity or further refined to be pumped 
directly into the gas mains, or used in automotive engines. 
Each household in the UK is estimated to produce up 
to 2.5 kg of food waste per week. The minimum plant 
size can be below 10 tons per annum but to generate real 
value the economies of scale start to work above 15 tons 
per annum, with the optimal sizes being in the region 
of 30 to 40 thousand tons, based on the Government 
incentives for this kind of energy production which 
may increase during the review of subsidies currently 
underway. Thus one could reasonably conclude that 
the minimum operating size would be in support of a 
super garrison, and its support network. AD energy 
production is currently being reviewed and industry 
expects the subsidies to be increased. The Government 
is also reviewing the use of sewerage sludge in the same 
plants as food waste and allowing the output to be used 
on anything except agriculture land. This is a common 
practice in continental Europe, although it has been 
resisted up to now in the UK. In turn this may present 
opportunities to reduce the cost of infrastructure when 
AD plants are used in combination with sewerage 
plants. This is the sort of technology that may only 
prove practicable if the super garrison concept is fully 
realised. If this does become the model for the army in 
the medium term, then this kind of sustainable energy 
production model should be considered on sustainability 
grounds alone. 
Energy from Waste
This process involves large scale burning of waste 
products in incinerators (and it is by this name that 
many local campaigners know this technology and have 
successfully campaigned to resist its introduction). The 
large-scale incinerator works of hundreds of thousands 
of tons of waste have become socially unacceptable and 
have been resisted strongly wherever they have been 
mooted. The basic technologies burn waste using the heat 
created to drive the generators, usually through steam. 
They will accept all forms of waste or could be used for 
a sorted faction on a larger scheme where the bio-waste, 
metals and glass have been removed.
These processes are not popular technologies among 
civilian (and presumably military communities) and 
would require a very large establishment to operate using 
solely its waste, again along the super garrison scale of 
operation. It is more likely that most establishments 
would provide part of the waste to a plant that also 
accepts waste from elsewhere. Some of the interview 
evidence obtained from the commercial sector suggested 
that military establishments might be an appropriate place 
to locate such technologies, although the Review team 
found no evidence that the defence community would be 
any more acceptant to it, than civilian communities. 
Waste Management
One of the key conclusions and recommendations of 
this report is that appropriate joint ventures between 
the MoD and other public authorities, and the MoD 
and private interests, are essential elements to the 
development of the DE/DIO in the future, and this 
is particularly pertinent and true in the case of the 
utilisation and rationalisation of the defence estate. 
One of the key areas in which this could occur is waste 
management, where the sheer size of the defence estate 
43 ‘Huhne Unveils Details of two phase RHI scheme’, Utility Week, (10 March 2011). http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/
news_story.asp?id=195180&title=Huhne+unveils+details+of+two-phase+RHI+scheme+ accessed 11 March 2011.
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and the remoteness of parts of the estate could be utilised, 
without adversely impacting on the core defence role, to 
take on waste management activities that are necessary 
but often controversial within many civilian communities. 
In Portsmouth, the Royal Navy has examined the 
possibility of utilising a waste energy solution that would 
allow the site to become partly self-sufficient in meeting 
its energy needs. There are private sector partners already 
in circulation to make such schemes a viable option for 
the MoD, but these need to be sought out and plans 
developed. It is important to note that waste management 
schemes are necessarily local: it is not commercially 
viable for waste to be transported large distances, but 
it is certainly viable for waste to be factored into local, 
strategic planning, where the MoD is a significant 
stakeholder and could demonstrate best practice in 
sustainability. At this stage it is unlikely that these 
schemes will generate a noticeable level of income to any 
public authority running them, but for environmental 
and sustainability reasons they are potentially important 
activities for the MoD to be involved in. 
Reducing whole life facility costs
The reduction of ‘whole life costs’ (WLC) is already 
taken into account with the refurbishment of existing 
defence buildings and the new build facilities across 
the defence estate. The remaining scope for WLC is in 
how utilisation can be made across the defence estate in 
general. There are many way of achieving this, some of 
which the DE already does. Private sector thinking would 
most likely lead to a process of combining the functions 
of several sites into one (potentially problematic because 
of inter-service rivalry, the security requirement to avoid 
single points of failure and the differing operational need 
of the different services),44 investing in modern facilities 
with lower running costs (problematic because of new 
spending requirements) and trying to utilise commercially 
driven social housing models to try and reduce the unit 
cost of new builds. 
Disposal
The MoD is obliged, as are all Government 
departments, to dispose of land that is surplus to 
requirements (or for which there is not a planned future 
use). The disposal of MoD land is therefore currently 
guided by a set of narrow external rules and the strong 
positive externality of the NAO estimate that for every 
1% of the defence estates disposed of £29 million pounds 
of attendant running costs per year might be achieved. 
Although the DE has conducted a review to determine 
whether parts of the estate are Core, Retained or For 
Disposal45, that review did not take into account ‘cost 
per head/capitation’, in addition, while DE’s current 
vision is an ‘estate of the right size’, it (and its successor 
organisation DIO) has yet to define what this actually 
is. Under the Department’s 2010 development plan 
which classified the main 525 sites in the UK, 72% were 
listed as ‘core’, which represented 95% of the defence 
estate’s land - only 2% of the land was listed as suitable 
‘disposal’.46 Given this delay in defining what the right 
size actually is, there should be scope for outsiders to the 
DE/DIO process to conduct an independent review of 
what the ‘right size’ should be, including what role the 
private sector should play in managing non-operational 
parts of the estate, to assist the DE/DIO in its planned 
shrinkage and in becoming a ‘thin-client’. Another major 
driver behind disposal are capital receipts. The classic 
example of this is the so-called ‘Annington Homes’ deal 
of 1996, which provided a large capital receipt to the 
Treasury (although not the MoD), but left an expensive 
legacy for the MoD, which has yet to be fully met. 
In the finance section, land swaps and ‘release to 
reprovide’ (R2R) schemes were mentioned, with a 
key example being where London based units (RAF 
Uxbridge, Mill Hill, Bentley Priory etc) have been/are 
being relocated to RAF Northolt under Project MoDEL. 
It may be advantageous in value terms to release sites 
that are still operational where they have a high private 
sector value and move operations to other lesser value 
sites, e.g. an operational site in a high value residential 
area could be released and the MoD function transferred 
to a site with no obvious commercial value.47 This could 
also have an employment angle where the relocation site 
is in a deprived area thus spreading the economically 
regenerative aspect of defence activity. If this sort of 
activity were to run more widely across the defence estate 
it would need to be centrally controlled and planned to 
avoid local opposition from those seeking to make special 
pleadings as has been the case in several instances, such 
as Prime Portsmouth. Furthermore, the possibility of 
releasing historic buildings for conversion to new uses 
should be considered as they generate higher values and 
from an MoD viewpoint are inefficient and expensive to 
operate and occupy when compared to a modern facility; 
the decision to vacate RAF Scampton was based partly 
on the development and maintenance of the site proving 
too expensive given the number of listed buildings.
44 There are several examples of where the RAF has located an entire capability at a single site that makes it vulnerable to a single point of failure. 
45 Core = needed for defence purposes to at least 2030; Retained = needed for defence purposes to at least 2015; For Disposal = no clear current 
operational purpose identified by parent Budget Holder, and is therefore surplus to defence needs.
46 National Audit Office, A Defence Estate of the right size to meet operational needs, HC 70 Session 2010-2011, (The Stationary Office: London, July 
2010), p.19.
47 This could also apply to flag-ship properties in London, like the Hyde Park Barracks 
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The issue of disposal is often highly contentious and 
always attracts the strong attention of local communities 
and politicians with interests in the region. A centralised 
process in which the rationale for such decisions remains 
clear and defendable best manages such pressures. A 
significant issue for the MoD’s entire budget is the 1996 
Annington Homes decision that has a very large and 
un-costed spending requirement approaching in 2015. 
The Married Quarter Estate (MQE) in England and 
Wales was sold to Annington (via a Japanese wealth 
fund) for £1.6 billion.48 The initial recommendations had 
been to place the MQE in a not-for-profit trust, but after 
consultations with the private sector the Government 
of the day decided to transfer the entire MQE to the 
private sector. The MoD received a ring-fenced £100 
million for repairs to the estate, but has remained under 
an obligation to keep the entire MQE up to a certain 
standard, even though they no longer own it, while 
the Treasury retained the remaining £1.5 billion. The 
properties were reportedly not properly surveyed prior to 
the sale, so the MoD had little real sense of the extent of 
its future maintenance and repair liability, but estimates 
the HERO Review team obtained placed this in the 
region of £350 million - which would become due in 
2015. This liability was not mentioned in the SDSR as 
a potential future outlay. The MoD signed a 200-year 
lease on the properties (paying 42% of market rent 
under a fully repairing lease on each property, which is 
reviewed every five years), agreed to pay for voids, while 
Annington Homes remained free to dispose of declared 
surplus property.  
What Annington received was a wide variety of 
property – from very valuable Commander in Chief 
properties (which had been refurbished just prior to 
sale to Annington), to the very well maintained RAF 
married quarters houses (which had seen an £84million 
investment by the RAF in the mid-1980s to keep them in 
prime condition for retention purposes), to army married 
quarters housing, which was less well maintained. It 
was undoubtedly sensible to bring all married quarters 
into a unified organisation, if for no other reason than 
to unify standards across the MQE, although this was 
strongly resisted by the service chiefs at the time, who 
were essentially given a choice between losing equipment 
lines or the MQE. But the MoD, in losing the ownership 
of these properties, in paying rent on them, and in 
remaining obliged to repair them, undoubtedly got a 
very bad deal indeed, whilst the Exchequer took a very 
short-term capital receipt. It is notable that the Defence 
Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and 
National Audit Office all criticised the deal and the way 
the due diligence was undertaken. It has further been 
asserted that the overall value of the housing stock had 
been priced at £150m under book price, for the time. The 
massive house price inflation during the decade thereafter 
further compounds this as an exemplar of how Treasury 
desire and MoD needs can be misaligned. 
Whilst another Annington Homes type-deal is unlikely, 
the lessons from this case are clear when it comes to 
future disposals, namely: the contract price, and the 
future commitments such deals create. The MoDEL 
project which relocated MoD elements from Uxbridge 
and Mill Hill to Northolt) was careful to ensure that 
developers had to put the land to market at best value, 
with the MoD sharing in the profits, and the developer 
obliged to prepare the land for the sale. Some lessons have 
clearly been learned since 1995. The DE/DIO also now 
has the challenge function of the Government Property 
Unit to consider in structuring disposals.
Conclusion
Utilisation remains the last big area of thinking 
concerning the defence estate that is under-developed. 
The main reform that would assist in this area is a change 
to Treasury rules governing what can be done with 
Government land. Based on its research, the review 
team would not suggest a wholesale reform, freeing up 
Government departments to become quasi-businesses 
- they must still focus on core tasks - but there are some 
sensible and obvious partnership arrangements that 
would help reduce the cost of running the defence estate 
and bring in valuable income. Interviews conducted 
right at the end of the review period with Treasury 
advisors indicated that these reforms would be delivered 
during 2011, which then switches the emphasis to how 
the MoD and the wider defence community can create 
partnerships to deliver these joint infrastructure projects.
Wholesale reform, freeing up Government departments 
to become quasi-businesses does not, according to the 
evidence the HERO Review obtained, appear as clear 
cut, especially as ministries will still need to focus on 
core tasks. But there do appear to be some sensible 
and obvious partnership arrangements that would help 
reduce the cost of running the defence estate and bring 
in valuable income. Interviews conducted with Treasury 
advisors right at the end of the HERO Review period 
indicated that significant reforms would be delivered 
during 2011 which switches the emphasis to how the 
MoD and the wider defence community can create 
partnerships to deliver these joint infrastructure projects. 
Key areas of utilisation that could be taken forward 
by the MoD include power generation and waste 
management. The RAF’s initiatives to give civilian usage 
48 The MoD has retained ownership of the residential married quarter estate in Scotland.
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to some of their airfields are also worth pursuing, but 
may not prove as important as these two principle foci. 
In terms of disposal, the review’s research that this is best 
encapsulated through land-swap and ‘release to reprovide’ 
schemes. There does not appear to be the market, or 
the private money to support traditional disposal to the 
private sector in the short to medium term, and that 
any disposals outside of the M25 area will not represent 
value for money on any commonsense understanding of 
the term. The Government does appear committed to 
releasing surplus military land to local authorities for new 
housing schemes however.49 
It is important to note that none of these utilisation 
measures will transform the finances of the MoD, 
or the defence community, but if the Government’s 
environment and sustainability agenda is a serious one, 
then these kinds of initiatives are important signals. 
Moreover, the political direction of travel in the public 
sector is that public authorities should be transforming 
themselves into lean organisations capable of doing more 
with less, and contributing to their running costs through 
efficiency measures or commercialisation opportunities. 
Such contributions may only be in the magnitude of 
order of 10% of running costs, but it is the change in 
operating culture that is the important point, and it is 
this transformation that both the MoD and the DE (and 
its successor Defence Infrastructure Organisation) are 
embarking upon. 
 49 The 2011 budget indicated that the Government would expedite planning decisions for surplus military land and would seek MoD estate 
disposals valued at up to £350m.
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FM is commonly divided into two categories, though 
many companies provide both services, sometimes 
simultaneously. ‘Hard’ FM refers to the provision and 
upkeep of buildings and equipment, ‘Soft FM’ refers 
to the provision of on-site services such as catering. 
In PFI and PPP contracts, a subcontractor usually 
provides FM to the services provider (the private partner 
who works at the same level as the building provider), 
although opportunities exist for vertical integration since 
the service provider does not have to subcontract the 
provision of FM.
Britain has a vibrant and growing FM sector. It is 
currently valued at £170 billion and it remains a growth 
industry. The British FM industry is more advanced 
than that of other countries, in part because due to its 
age it is the most mature of its kind. The industry has all 
sizes of service provider, from small and medium sized 
catering firms to giants such as Serco, which has revenue 
of almost £4 billion. FM is a field tailored to clients needs. 
Companies bid for service delivery defined by the client. 
There is an industry trend, via mergers and acquisitions 
towards Total Facilities Management (TFM), that is, a 
single company providing both hard and soft FM and 
front of house service as part of a single contract, although 
this trend does not seem to have been so keenly followed 
in the defence sector. The current model is mostly one 
whereby construction forms make a company acquisition 
of a ‘soft-FM’ provider, to create the in-house capability, 
or via careful contractual relations. 
One of the key issues in the FM sector is that there is 
no industry standard contract; all are bespoke to suit the 
needs of a particular client. Due in part to its age and 
maturity, FM is drawing in experts from other sectors 
and increasingly, companies are being engaged earlier 
in the process of outsourcing. Large FM firms have the 
capability to design services for entire departments, 
not just replicate services designed by the client. 
Furthermore, integrating service provision planning 
at earlier stages allows FM contractors to work with 
architects to help develop buildings that enable more 
efficient service provision. As has been noted in previous 
sections, the need for sensible and effective partnerships 
to be formed across Government, the wider public 
sector and industry is crucial here. Similarly, the sorts 
of flexibility called for in the financing section of this 
report are echoed here. FM contracts retain the same 
inflexibility that can be observed in traditional PFI deals. 
Building in flexibility increases the cost of the service 
being provided many-fold, but it is this kind of flexibility 
that is required in a defence context that is subject to 
changing operational needs. The review team found no 
evidence of the MoD attempting to model the costs of 
providing these services in-house, where the risk factor 
could be consumed within departmental budgets: namely 
extra-services would incur the same risk as the private 
contractors, but any savings would be kept in-house 
rather than having been passed on as part of a private 
contractors risk calculation. 
The theoretical opportunities for the British 
Government in engaging the services of FM specialists 
is the cost-efficiencies gained by doing so, particularly 
over many sites. Engaging these external services can 
also provide cost certainties (built into the contract) over 
a number of years, and provide immunity from short-
term cuts - therefore these contracts may provide better 
value for money over the medium to long-term. FM has 
become a specialised endeavour in its own right, and 
companies that bid for FM contracts do so because they 
believe that they can provide a better and cheaper service 
than a non-outsourced option. As the Government moves 
increasingly towards being a service enabler -and this 
is certainly borne out by the development of the DIO - 
based on a smaller civil service bureaucracy, contracting 
services for FM makes political and bureaucratic 
sense. Furthermore, FM is inherently managing the 
risk to service provision created by non-functioning 
or poorly managed facilities necessary to provide a 
service. Contracting FM services is, just like many of the 
financial models that have been discussed in this report, 
Abstract 
A key feature of modern Government buildings is the presence of private contractors carrying 
out Facilities Management (FM). This short section briefly explains what FM is and what scope 
there may be for the extension of FM across the Defence Estate. The central recommendation of 
this section is the critical evaluation of FM practices in the defence community to see if the fixed 
contract FM model is suitable in the defence environment, where operational flexibility is an 
ongoing reality.
Chapter Four: Facilities Management
The HERO Review: Harnessing Efficiencies, Rethinking Outcomes The Future of the Defence Estate38
effectively transferring risk to the private sector, and this 
is necessary under Treasury rules which are geared to 
transferring risk to those who are best able to manage 
them. Those who work or live in MoD buildings will 
have seen a marked improvement in their upkeep over the 
last fifteen years, which is in part due to the programme 
of building works to update facilities, but also due to 
the improved management of facilities, which can be 
seen as a success even if there have been some adverse 
publicity based on some of the costing within individual 
contracts. A comprehensive critical evaluation of whether 
the flexibility required by the defence community lends 
itself to fixed contracts is overdue: defence may be one of 
the special cases across Government where operational 
flexibility trumps the need for fixed pricing, but the 
political necessity currently is for continued outsourcing. 
Conclusion
Based on the research the review team conducted 
there seems limited scope for the large-scale extension of 
FM across the defence community. This is partly due to 
market saturation – namely most of the facilities apt for 
FM outsourcing have already occurred – but primarily 
due to the MoD holding unique requirements for 
flexibility because of the roles it performs. There is scope 
though, as has already been proven across elements of the 
defence estate, for FM contracts to control and reduce 
costs to the MoD and the Treasury.
There is much activity by the military and MoD that 
requires flexibility in its facilities, and in the management 
of these facilities. It is in this regard that fixed FM 
contracts (fixed for pricing purposes) can be ill-suited to 
the defence environment. A critical and sensible review 
of where FM can be used in the defence estate and where 
it would be more sensible to retain a non-outsourced 
capacity should be undertaken, but the team recognise 
that the political backdrop to the issue will drive up the 
number of outsourced contracts, rather than suppress 
them. There may also be scope for ‘big society’ initiatives 
to engage in this kind of activity. Collectives of service 
families (for example) could perhaps tender for the FM 
contracts of their local military establishment. The 
creation of these kind of social firms have very strong 
political support from the Government, and it would be 
interesting to see whether these local collectives could 
challenge the established providers for these lucrative 
contracts. 
 
   Outsourcing FM is effectively civilianising a proportion 
of defence activity. Contracts between the Government 
and the private sector are fixed and can be far less flexible 
than the statutory arrangements that exist between the 
Government and the armed forces. If the entirety of 
this type of service was to be contracted to the private 
sector by the MoD, then the armed forces would lose the 
technical capacity to perform those services without the 
aid of the private sector. That would be the end-logic 
of the ‘thin-client’ model of bureaucratic reform present 
across Whitehall and the Ministry of Defence. To avoid 
this, contracts will need to be very carefully drawn up 
and monitored, from a Government perspective, to ensure 
that these represent good value for money. 
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Following many years of criticism regarding the 
state of much single living accommodation, Project 
SLAM was initiated by DE, and awarded in 2002, 
as a £500m contract to upgrade the accommodation 
utilised by unmarried service personnel, or those on 
weekly commutes away from their stable homes. 
This was in recognition of the MoD’s commitment to 
significantly improve living standards for its Service 
personnel. This commitment was not entirely born of 
altruism - survey evidence had shown that the image 
of the armed forces had been negatively affected by the 
reputation of its single living accommodation and that 
this might impact on recruitment and of course if correct, 
retention. A significant volume of new accommodation 
has been constructed over the last seven years under the 
SLAM programme. There is likely to be an additional 
requirement for this type of accommodation when the 
Army (the RAF has already left) is fully withdrawn from 
Germany (as announced in the SDSR), as operational 
requirements dictate where personnel can be placed. 
This will involve a net spend for the MoD as the land 
in Germany that is to be vacated is not only not owned 
by the British Government, but may require investment 
before it can be returned to the German state – an issue 
beyond the scope of this study. 
The aim of Project SLAM was to provide a 
comfortable and secure living environment fit for 
21st Century living, and JSP464 (the Tri-Service 
Accommodation Regulations) set out the minimum 
standards service personnel can expect from their 
accommodation. Just as university halls of residence 
provide students with their first taste of living away from 
home, SLA does the same for many young recruits into 
the military. The design of this accommodation performs 
the function of trying to simultaneously bond a group 
together, whilst allowing for private time and space and 
many university halls of residence look and feel the same 
as military SLA facilities. A key aspect of SLAM was 
the desire to use it as a tool of retention, and in practice 
personnel are allowed to retain their rooms even when 
they are on tour, for their use when they return, making 
it more of a permanent home and saving on MoD storage 
facilities. 
JSP464 established the minimum standards that service 
personnel could expect. This is captured by taxonomy of 
entitlement, based on hierarchical level: 
Abstract 
Of all of the topics examined during the HERO Review, Single Living Accommodation (SLA) 
appears to be the most settled. Project SLAM is reported to have delivered good quality SLA 
across the armed forces and to a standard and level of security that is appreciated by all of those 
who have used it. This section should be read, therefore, as a counsel of perfection rather than a 
fundamental critique. 
The return from Germany of the remaining 20,000 British Army soldiers (and their estimated 
23,000 dependents), announced in the SDSR, will create the need for significant additional SLA 
facilities, including in all likelihood new build facilities, and thus the issue of cost-savings generated 
by using different manufacturing techniques and materials will become salient. In addition, there 
are some issues around innovation and sustainability in the existing SLAM model, and the DE’s 
control of the SLAM concept, that may require addressing for the model to be sustainable in the 
longer term. 
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The MoD’s response to these design parameters was 
to create a ‘standard model design’. They claimed this 
would generate efficiencies from suppliers as they became 
acquainted with putting these design parameters into 
practice. A number of the architects we interviewed 
said that while the ‘standard model design’ was an 
architecturally sound approach, it was not necessarily a 
cost effective solution, nor was is it likely to be sustainable 
in the long-term. From the evidence of a variety of 
interviewees, we are content to say that SLAM has been 
a success in as much as it has improved the standard of 
accommodation across the services for the young men 
and women recruited into the armed forces to serve the 
UK. However, we also discovered a very large number of 
criticisms about the SLA programme, and the demands 
of DE in connection with these contracts. 
DE, as the originator of the standard model design, has 
defended its approach stoutly. Possibly fearing a plurality 
of approaches would produce confusion across the estate 
and the sort of inconsistency that was present before 
2000, DE has defended its SLA model to the hilt. One 
of the major and presumably unintended consequences 
JSP 315
Scale Rank of Occupant Description
30
Senior Officers (Major and 
equivalent) and above
A suite of rooms in the Officers Mess consisting of a sitting 
room and bedroom with en suite provision (shower, basin and 
WC). 
32
Junior Officers (Captain and 
equivalent) and below
A bedroom with en suite provision 
(Shower, basin and WC).
32 Officer Cadet
A bedroom with en suite provision 
(Shower, basin and WC).
Candidate A bedroom with shared ablutions
35 WO and SNCO A bedroom with en suite provision (shower, basin and WC).
3Z Other ranks A bedroom with en suite provision
3Y Personnel undergoing Ph 2 training Bed space in a 4 person room with shared ablutions
3X Personnel undergoing Ph 1 Training Bed space in a 8 or 12 person room with shared ablutions
SLA Typologies
Occupancy Storeys Where?
Junior Officers: 
6-man flats
3
Allenby and Connaught
8-man flats 4 DTR, training estate
8-man terraced house 3 Allenby and Connaught and DTR
Hotel-style 5 Northwood
Officers and SNCOs
12/14 man hotel-style
3-4 Various
of the standard model design approach has been to limit 
the enthusiasm (and therefore competition) between 
major contractors for SLAM work. The standard model 
design is so tightly configured that there is little room for 
innovation and similarly little room for competitive profit 
making, and those tendering for SLA projects with the 
DE are forced to think of ever more inventive ways of 
adding facilities to the overall package, in which they can 
demonstrate innovation and value-added. A consequence 
of this is that technologies that could address the 
important issue of sustainability are missing from the 
SLAM facilities, a potentially serious shortcoming which 
may lead to the SLAM concept becoming unviable in 
the future. This was not what the original Project SLAM 
envisaged. There has also been considerable criticism 
of the existing arrangements over spiralling costs, which 
have led to a cost of £70,000 per bed space (which is 
10-15% more expensive than the Defence Training 
Rationalisation Programme (DTR) equivalent) and 
there is a commitment to try and deliver 18% capital 
cost savings in SLA provision by 31 March 2012. By 
comparison, civilian single room accommodation such as 
university halls of residence cost substantially less per bed 
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space in some case as much as £40,000, less, although 
MoD claim that such accommodation is not directly 
comparable. 
As things stand, 35,000 bed spaces out of a total of 
90,000 are listed as Z scale (highest quality) with a 
further 20,000 at grade 2. The current DE strategy for 
continued investment includes a further programme of 
building new SLA accommodation blocks to full-scale 
modern standard, typically for trained personnel in single 
rooms with en-suite facilities. Whilst the majority of 
those who are in SLAM accommodation are pleased with 
it, it has created some tensions with those left in pre-
SLAM and yet to be modernised accommodation, whilst 
some have opted to remain in those pre-modernised 
facilities because the rent they pay is substantially 
less. Overall, the picture is positive, but there is some 
unevenness that is worthy of mention. 
The DE strategy for SLA also includes major 
refurbishment works for some existing facilities, but 
only where it is more cost effective than new-build 
projects. Some of these will be the so-called Z-standard, 
but the plans also include provision for a mix of 
standards including shared toilet and shower facilities. 
A programme of minor improvements to older blocks 
that are not due for replacement or refurbishment within 
the next 5 years is ongoing, and focuses on the facilities 
most needed by the occupants such as new furniture, 
modernised showers and toilets, improved storage space, 
improved heating systems and better Internet access, 
which we are told was in response to a survey of end-
users, and which cost in the region of £16-18,000 per 
room. The MoD’s aim, which appears realistic, if rather 
modest, is that by March 2013 about 50% of trained 
personnel will be in Grade 1 Z scale SLA. Beyond 2013 
there is much less certainty about both demand and 
funding, but there is a ‘soft’ intention that by 2020 some 
70% will be in Grade 1 SLA and the remainder in Grade 
2. By that time, all accommodation for initial trainees 
should be at the appropriate scale (X or Y) and most will 
be at Grade 1. The HERO Review’s interview evidence 
suggested that temporary accommodation for those 
moving towards overseas operational tours is currently the 
lowest priority for improvement, and in reality is highly 
unlikely to be improved even by 2020. 
SLAM may be re-procured under the Next Generation 
Estates Contracts (NGEC) as a new contract, or 
projects may be delivered using the MoD’s core works 
construction frameworks that are being drawn up 
in 2011, and which are one-off contracts for major 
construction works.50 New SLA projects, including 
those that may accommodate returning personnel from 
Germany, may be tagged onto other projects, such as the 
regeneration of the defence training estate. That will not 
necessarily introduce innovation, or sustainability into 
the SLAM model, and so arguably does not advance the 
SLAM argument very far. Overall, we would note that 
the DE remains wedded to this particular approach to 
single living accommodation. 
Detailed cost comparators have been used to 
benchmark SLAM accommodation with other 
equivalent public service accommodation (such as that 
provided in Higher Education, by the Metropolitan 
Police Force and the National Health Service). Within 
these comparators the defence estate’s SLA has been 
seen as expensive. DE claim that the SLA is necessarily 
more expensive than civilian SLA because of the more 
exacting security standards that have to be obeyed by 
military contractors. These standards are derived from a 
restricted document, JSP-440, which, despite requests, 
the review team has not been given access to,51 but which 
were are told places some compliance issues surrounding 
a building’s resistance to shrapnel from mortar or car 
bomb attack, and progressive collapse technologies in the 
event of it being attacked. We are unable to assess these 
requirements but would note that progressive collapse 
strictures are now commonly found within civilian 
building regulations and to defend huge additional 
costs on the basis of classified security standards is 
unsatisfactory. 
There is a wider question, however, of what number 
of SLAM sites require these extensive counterterrorism 
measures when they are already ‘behind the wire’ in 
military establishments. It should be noted that we 
believe that under JSP440, all SLAM sites require some 
measures, which alter depending on how close to the wire 
they are. To change these requirements would require 
the MoD to go through a risk assessment process to judge 
how proportionate these measures are. It is inescapable 
however, that the counterterrorism measures have been 
used by the DE to justify its overly tight control over the 
SLAM concept and design, and to ward off innovation 
from architects, construction partners and service 
personnel alike. The security challenges of modern day 
terrorism have considerably developed since the major 
terror campaigns of Irish Republicans in the 1970s and 
1980s and the concept of behind and outside the wire 
in terms of security for citizens as well as armed forces 
personnel is perhaps one that deserves reconsideration.
The construction firms the team interviewed during 
this study estimated that they could provide SLA bed 
space, based on their experience of providing higher 
education bed space (to a comparable standard to the 
50 Defence Estates, ‘Next Generation Estates Contracts’, Ministry of Defence: London, accessed 5 March 2011, http://www.mod.uk/
DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DE/WhatWeDo/NextGenerationEstateContracts.htm
51 It should be noted that the document appears in full on the Wikileaks website, although the HERO Review team did not attempt to access it there.
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SLAM model) at between £29k to £44k per bed space 
(with a large amount of that price differential taken up 
in the cost of land being built upon). It was suggested, 
therefore, that the DE should look to freeing up the 
design restraints a little (particularly in terms of the 
rigidity of the specifications and materials) and the 
imposition of a one design solution fits all approach, 
perhaps by taking on value management techniques to 
drive out waste from building specifications and design 
guidelines. It was argued that this would assist the DE/
DIO in moving towards its ambition of 18% capital cost 
savings on this type of accommodation. The team have 
concluded that it should be possible for the DE/DIO, 
as the owner of the SLAM design, to invite proposals 
from industry (be it construction firms or architects) 
to see what kind of innovation is possible within the 
constraining counterterrorism measures. This would not 
remove ownership of SLAM from DE/DIO, but might 
assist in providing innovation and sustainability into 
the SLAM model. Such transparency might be easier if 
the DE/DIO was configured as a national corporation, 
looking to maximise value for money (VfM) against 
operational outcomes, or as an entirely private entity, 
better able to interact with its commercial partners.
Possible Future Avenues: 
Off Site Construction: 
Accommodation used in higher education settings now 
often contains an element of off-site construction. One 
such type is Unite’s Modular Solutions, which because of 
efficiencies of scale produces cost savings. Confidential 
industry data, from one of the leading providers of higher 
education accommodation, demonstrated that the 
inclusion of full modular technology in SLAM (which 
would make SLAM sites portable across the country) 
could produce 20% cost savings. Another advantage 
of a part-modular approach is that it would give the 
SLAM a ‘plug and play’ dimension: in essence modular 
accommodation can be moved around the defence 
estate to match the changing needs of the defence estate 
and operational requirements. A recent SLA project 
at Catterick used off-site construction and the use of 
modular units.52
Refurbishment: 
Based on its interview evidence the team think there 
is scope to learn from the private sector such as how 
to ‘retrofit housing for the future’ and the lessons from 
these projects to meet low carbon sustainability targets. 
The cost of refurbishments range from £50/m2 to £850/
m2, depending on the work to be done (from the lightest 
refurbishment, to the ‘strip back to frame’ comprehensive 
approach).
Use of private sector operator: 
Most student accommodation is operated by third 
parties and examining the sort of proposition that big 
higher education providers like Unite or UPP could bring 
may well bring new types of thinking and cost reductions 
into the mix. We were told that large investment groups 
would not consider investing in the defence estate if 
they were not given control over the management of the 
property, as they demand in other settings. It might also 
be possible to rent out property to ex-forces personnel, 
which might reduce the problem of disadvantageous 
disposals, but also help ex-forces personnel to transition 
into civilian life. What this means in practice, on a 
defence site, is not entirely clear, as there are external 
factors such as security and the fact that all SLA is 
behind the perimeter wire of military establishments that 
cannot be wholly militated against. 
The review team interviewed representatives from 
the NHS and the Metropolitan Police Service to make 
a comparison of the observable practices. The NHS 
operates stable SLA models, and has been able to benefit 
from being relatively flexible in the design parameters 
and being similarly flexible (on a Trust by Trust basis) 
as to how the accommodation is owned, managed and 
maintained. The Metropolitan Police, however, took the 
decision in 2006 to close all their SLA facilities (section 
houses in their terminology), having reduced them 
from 3300 to 750 bed spaces from 1996 to 2006. The 
Metropolitan Police took this decision on the basis that 
demand from their officers for this kind of provision had 
been reducing, and that their finances could no longer 
stretch to the costs of maintaining these facilities. In 
short, they decided that this kind of provision was not 
a part of their core business, and they could no longer 
afford to keep pursuing it. Whilst the police and the 
military operate in different circumstances, this is merely 
indicative of the type of shift in the approach of other 
public services to these similar questions. In that vein 
then, the DE could place the SLA into private hands and 
simply be the paymaster for this kind of activity, rather 
than be so intimately involved in it. 
Conclusion
Project SLAM has delivered a large improvement to 
the SLA stock across the defence estate, and seems to 
be liked by those service men and women who use it. 
This has had a positive effect in terms of the reputation 
of the armed forces and retention issues created by poor 
accommodation, but this is not a unified picture. An 
internal (and limited) RAF study found that there was 
some resentment amongst service personnel occupying 
pre-SLAM blocks because they lack the modern facilities 
52 MoD Estate and Environment (27 January 2011) ‘Yorkshire soldiers get new accommodation’, Ministry of Defence: London.
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of SLAM, but conversely that because the rents are 
cheaper in the pre-SLAM units, some prefer to pay the 
lower rent and sacrifice the modern facilities. This is, of 
course, part of the rich empirical tapestry of service life, 
but such observations do highlight some tensions within 
this programme. 
The top-end cost of SLAM does appear expensive 
when compared to other types of SLA, possibly to the 
tune of £25,000 per bed space, including full recognition 
of the security factors built into military SLA which 
the review team think is partly mitigated by it being 
located behind the wire. If the current design parameters 
were retained, it would make some sense to move the 
SLAM units closer to the wire so that as the defence 
estate footprint is reduced the SLAM units effectively 
are moved outside the wire and used for other purposes, 
such as hotels or conference facilities. This provides the 
potential for recovering some of the costs of construction 
in the future. Some cost-savings could also be derived 
by introducing some flexibility into the Project SLAM 
model, and by embracing some new technologies, such 
as modular engineering (which would also open up 
flexibility across the defence estate and the potential for a 
secondary market) and new materials technology (which 
would also assist in meeting sustainability targets). 
 
The HERO Review’s research suggests that 
introducing private money (be it through investment 
funds or existing private SLA providers) into future 
SLA requirements might prove problematic unless 
the DE fully adopts its thin-client approach and gives 
over management responsibilities to the private sector. 
Reducing this management function would also assist the 
DE to achieve its institutional rationalisation targets. 
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SFA is a type of housing provided by the UK armed 
forces to serving members of the military with spouses or 
children. The stock of housing is provided because the 
nature of military appointments means that servicemen 
and women are expected to move with the requirements 
of the Armed Forces. This requirement is part of military 
law and is integral to the contractual obligation that 
service personnel enter into when they join the armed 
forces. This clearly segregates service personnel from the 
typical social practice, in which professionals generally 
expect to purchase a property of their own in which to 
live. Owner occupation has risen from 51% in 1981 to 
around 70% in the contemporary market and is likely to 
remain so. Demand for housing has outstripped supply 
Abstract 
Service Families Accommodation (SFA) has been a controversial issue within the defence 
community since at least the mid-1990s. Controversies have continued about the standard of the 
accommodation, how it is maintained, its cost, the value for money it has represented on disposal 
and the desire of the three services to retain control over it, prior to DE assuming control of it. The 
HERO Review team approached it from a sociological perspective in the first instance and have 
tried to look at what the social consequences are for what is widely perceived to be a failing area 
of Defence Estate activity. The problems with family accommodation run wider than crumbling 
infrastructure, there are the wider problems of service personnel not being on the property ladder 
(adversely affecting their personal financial planning), of being distant from broader society, and 
from being distant from mainstream and undisrupted education. So, the major challenges that the 
review team have identified within this section are: 
•	 Soft FM – the maintenance of these properties has been problematically managed from 
central sources. The review team think that localism is crucial in this area, to provide 
continuity and better sense to the maintenance. A system of grant-giving that allows service 
families to commission maintenance or improvement works for their family accommodation 
would give them a sense of ownership over their living space and would represent one 
solution to this ongoing problem. Whilst there are problems inherent with this approach 
as well, any system of centralised maintenance provision must be connected up to local 
providers and local solutions. 
•	 Personal finance – the team think there are good reasons for strongly encouraging home 
ownership amongst the military community. There have been differences between the 
services in this area given the differing approaches to basing historically. The lessening of 
rotation has eroded, to some degree, the punitive transaction costs of home ownership, 
and moves towards the so-called ‘super-garrisons’ in the Army would further improve this 
situation. To make home-ownership more attractive proposals should be worked up that 
would see service personnel being able to opt into a property bond scheme that would 
provide them with a cash lump-sum at the end of their service that would go a significant 
way to buying a house on the open market, or to buying a ‘service family accommodation’ 
house outright. The HERO Review has sought to think around ways of introducing more 
capital into the Defence Estate from private sources, of increasing the number of forces 
personnel with mortgages and home ownership aspirations, and to introduce (although a 
longer term aspiration) more of ordinary society into service family areas. The team think 
any such initiatives would have to also include the facilitation of good community amenities 
such as Government free schools, leisure facilities etc. 
Chapter Six: Service Families Accommodation
The HERO Review: Harnessing Efficiencies, Rethinking Outcomes The Future of the Defence Estate 45
to the extent that housing in many key locations is 
now unaffordable for the first time buyer. In response 
to this, a number of initiatives, such as the previous 
Government’s Key Worker Scheme, subsidise or spread 
the cost of buying a house. A typical scheme for low 
income households is to buy part of the leasehold from 
the developer, while paying rent on the fraction that is not 
owned. This allows individuals and families to invest in 
property that they would be otherwise unable to afford 
outright.
Professionals that regularly have to move as a result of 
their work expect a commensurate level of support from 
their employer so as to minimise disruption for themselves 
and their family. Civilian contracts that include employer 
flexibility to alter working conditions are usually balanced 
with additional compensation for the employee. Without 
such clauses, forcing an employee to move offices or 
locations breaches the employment contract and the 
employee has grounds to sue for constructive dismissal 
citing the Employment Rights Act, 1996.
In the UK, the military covenant is the primary 
concept for understanding the obligation that the MoD, 
on behalf of wider society, has to service personnel.53 
This does not serve as a legal requirement (and under 
current Government plans it is unlikely to do so), 
however its purpose has value and it is part of the socio-
political infrastructure of the UK. The covenant is an 
expression of the treatment that service personnel can 
expect from society at large in return for volunteering 
to perform dangerous (and possibly lethal) service, as 
well as being called upon to utilise violence and force 
in service of the sovereign and state. The additional 
strictures of military law are bound into this covenant: 
service personnel submit to a greater degree of control 
by the state but in return are promised a certain standard 
of support. Importantly, the covenant states that “British 
soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to 
be valued and respected as individuals, and that they 
(and their families) will be sustained and rewarded 
by commensurate terms and conditions of service.”54 
The inclusion of families of service personnel into the 
covenant leads to an expectation that they will be well 
supported. This includes provision of housing or other 
suitable arrangements to allow service personnel a stable 
family life.
There are many problems with SFA as it currently 
stands. Some of these problems are structural, that is, 
they are linked to the nature of military service and 
mostly revolve around issues of being rotated (moved) 
regularly. Another set of problems relate to the way the 
accommodation has been maintained and managed. 
Service families are not expected to manage or maintain 
(in a significant way) their accommodation, and there are 
no incentives for doing so as is common in private renting. 
Furthermore, the standard of the homes themselves, 
which often falls below the standards expected by 
civilians, is a documented source of discontent in the 
armed forces.55 There are also a category of problems, 
particularly affecting family relationships, which are 
caused by these structural problems and questions 
over whether the standard of family accommodation is 
symptomatic of the respect paid by society to serving 
armed forces personnel and their families.
The Army Families’ Federation (AFF) produces a 
quarterly qualitative report identifying issues that are 
raised by families, based on inquiries Federation has 
received in the previous three months. As the latest report 
shows, housing remains the number one topic, making up 
more than a third (36%) of all inquiries.56 Furthermore, 
AFF data since 2007 shows that housing is consistently 
the major concern raised by family members - generating 
almost 60% of inquiries in the second and fourth quarters 
of 2008. In Q4 2010, just over half the inquiries in 
connection with housing (51%) concerned repairs and 
maintenance, while 20% were to do with allocation 
and entitlement. With pay being frozen and allowances 
cut, the AFF has urged a freeze on accommodation 
charges: ‘AFF believes that any increase to charges for 
quarters will hit families very hard.’57 In addition, the 
AFF conducted an ‘easy poll’ of members’ concerns as 
the Army faces a period of transition over the next few 
years (such as the withdrawal from Germany and cuts in 
personnel numbers). The issues of primary concern for 
respondents were possible changes to pensions (42%), 
education (36%, particularly in connection with the 
Continuity of Education Allowance) followed by housing 
(22%). 
The RAF Families Federation also reports that ‘the 
top topic is housing’. Allocation policy and entitlement 
rules regarding Service Family Accommodation 
produced almost a quarter of queries to the organization, 
while concerns relating to repairs accounted for 17%.58 
53 The covenant was originally an Army concept but has been widened to embrace personnel and families of all three services. 
54 Ministry of Defence, Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 5: Soldiering —The Military Covenant, (2000). 
55 45% of service personnel living in service accommodation reported dissatisfaction with efforts to maintain or improve their accommodation 
(ACAS 2009, p.116)
56 Army Families Federation, Families’ Concerns Report, October-December 2010
 www.aff.org.uk/linkedfiles/aff/familiesconcernsoct-dec10.pdf
57 ibid
58 RAF Families Federation, Annual Report 2009, p10
 http://content.yudu.com/Library/A1p7ii/RAFFamiliesFederatio/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.yudu.com%2Fitem
%2Fdetails%2F221078%2FRAF-Families-Federation-Annual-Report-2009
The HERO Review: Harnessing Efficiencies, Rethinking Outcomes The Future of the Defence Estate46
Similarly, according to the Naval Families Federation, 
38% of all inquiries centre on housing.59 ‘Considering 
the small proportion of our families living in SFA that 
does not sit comfortably in the Naval Families Federation 
(NFF) office’.60 While the NFF called for investment in 
SFA as well as more affordable home purchase schemes, 
its website also includes news about the cancellation of a 
£16.1m SFA regeneration project ‘in the light of pressure 
on MoD finances and the recently announced reductions 
in the size of the Armed Forces’.61 
The problems caused by SFA are not slight. The 
UK’s armed forces face employee retention problems 
because of the strain, both mental and financial, that the 
current arrangements put on service families. Problems of 
community integration further exacerbate such problems. 
Many service families benefit from a strong culture of 
mutual aid between service families, but their links to the 
wider community can be weaker. The need to constantly 
move has further repercussions on those members of 
service families who are least equipped to deal with them: 
children. A Conservative party report before the last 
election on the Military Covenant found that the need 
to move was detrimental to the education of the children 
of service personnel.62 Furthermore the 2008 Armed 
Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey noted that 44% of 
Officers were dissatisfied with the way in which their 
service obligations were affecting their child’s education. 
This has a direct effect on service personnel morale 
(driven by the morale of their partners and children), 
and therefore affects the UK Armed Forces’ fighting 
potential as a whole. This problem is further highlighted 
by the results from The King’s Centre for Military Health 
Research, which found that some soldiers serving in Iraq 
overestimated the impact of their deployment on their 
partners and families at home.
A key problem with SFA is that military personnel 
do not have ultimate control or choice over where they 
live, or where they will be expected to move. Service 
families have no security of tenure in service family 
accommodation. Their current options are to rent SFA, 
rent privately (at considerable cost), or try to buy, 
but with the obvious downsides of being posted away 
regularly, making the transaction costs uneconomic. 
At present, the UK’s armed forces are spread over a 
number of locations, although consolidation is planned to 
move the majority of the armed forces into larger bases, 
commonly termed ‘super garrisons’.63 This process has 
been underway for some time in the Royal Navy and 
Royal Air Force, with a focus on key regions, but is still 
in relatively early stages for families of Army personnel. 
However, this lack of control does not necessarily have 
to cause as much disruption or uncertainty as it currently 
does. The main impact is that service personnel and their 
families cannot invest in property in the same manner 
that the majority of the British population can, and this 
can have a knock-on effect of failing to satisfy a spouse 
or partner’s desire to enjoy a full career as well. This 
is especially problematic for service personnel who do 
not plan on spending a full career in the armed forces 
- the majority of them (only 30% of officers and 43% 
of other ranks intended to stay in the armed forces for 
as long as they could according to the 2009 ACAS). In 
this way, extended service creates a wealth disparity 
between the armed forces and civilian professionals and 
the pay of service men and women does not bridge such 
disparities. A recent report by the Armed Forces’ Pay 
Review Body found that while enlisted ranks’ pay was 
largely in line with civilian pay, officers could expect 
to earn significantly less until they attained the rank 
of Lieutenant-Colonel (OF-4). This pay review only 
compared military pay with public salaries and there also 
exists a significant differential between public and private 
sector employees’ pay.64 
There are few professions in which renting property 
is almost a condition of the career itself. The required 
flexibility of the UK’s armed forces means that service 
personnel cannot easily invest in a property with the same 
25-year timescale as civilians, as they may be required to 
serve elsewhere in the country. The cost of buying and 
selling mortgaged property is not covered by the MoD, 
and therefore service personnel who move frequently 
will inevitably suffer financial hardship if they attempt 
to sell their property and buy a new home in line with 
every new posting. This has been militated somewhat by 
the subsidised schools fees scheme although this grant is 
thought likely to be reduced or even abolished soon. 
The standard of SFA is a further problem. Many 
of the housing units are below standards expected 
by the general civilian population. Service personnel 
increasingly expect similar standards of accommodation 
as their civilian peers, and it is arguably in line with the 
spirit of the military covenant. The provision of sub-
standard accommodation to service personnel and their 
families is an obvious breach of the military covenant, 
which was explored earlier in this report. Furthermore, 
the aspirations of the partners and spouses of service 
59 Naval Families Federation, ‘Service Families Accommodation Under the Microscope’ 
 http://www.nff.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid=59
60 ibid
61 ‘Cancellation of the Rowner Regeneration Project’, ibid
62 Military Covenant Commission, Restoring the Covenant, (Conservative Party: London, September 2008)
63 As outlined in the Defence Estate Development Plan, 2009, p.2
64 Pay Comparisons between the Armed Forces and the Civilian Sector, 2009
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personnel to live in quality homes is also having an 
impact on the way that service family accommodation is 
viewed. The MoD faces a considerable task in meeting 
these expectations, a task which it is arguably failing 
to do. Low quality, poorly maintained SFA is often the 
only type of accommodation that service personnel with 
families can afford. It is not hard to see that a combination 
of structural factors and poor housing could contribute to 
low morale for service personnel with families.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 
underlined the nation’s commitment to the military 
covenant.65 It also introduced further uncertainty into 
that unwritten contract by declaring a substantial re-
structuring of the UK’s armed forces. It is clear that 
certain changes, such as the British Army’s withdrawal 
from Germany, will be accelerated, but it is not yet clear 
how these forces will be integrated into the new super 
garrisons and whether other plans for the restructuring 
the defence estate will be brought forward to ensure 
appropriate space exists for these personnel.
There is a range of options for improving the existing 
SFA stock, as well as alternate methods of funding the 
provision of new SFA stock. The closure of some bases 
as part of the overall drive for efficiency will it is hoped 
release capital with which the MoD could provide 
suitable accommodation for its service personnel. The 
large-scale changes in force structure and placement 
in the near and medium term are designed to allow 
sufficient flexibility to overcome any initial teething 
problems of super garrisons and deliver a suitable service 
accommodation solution for Britain’s armed forces.
Conclusion
SFA has been a long running issue for the defence 
community, and whilst heavily subsidised family 
accommodation is a good benefit to many service 
personnel, the opportunity costs of not buying property 
or saving to do so, can create a significant problem later 
for some when leaving the forces. There is also reported 
to be a problem of a lack of knowledge amongst some 
service personnel regarding mortgages, managing a credit 
history and making financial provisions for the future. 
Specialist financial services provided by companies such 
as Blueforces, (which recently went into administration), 
made a strong contribution to transitioning forces 
and ex-service personnel into civilian forms of home 
ownership and rented accommodation.66 Such schemes 
are perhaps worthy of better thought out support from 
the MoD and it is to be hoped that similar, clearly very 
necessary schemes will spring up in light of the review of 
the defence estate and conditions of service review being 
conducted in the MoD at the time of writing. 
Finance is another significant problem. The review did 
not find any great appetite amongst the private financiers 
contacted to place significant investment into new 
service housing (something that is a common problem in 
the general economy as well) and most doubted that it 
would be forthcoming in the short term. There are some 
land-swap and smart-disposal options (including renting 
SFA to ex-service personnel) that may help overcome 
a number of these instinctive barriers however. The 
research team found considerable support for the view 
that an obvious route out of this problem was via the 
service personnel themselves, who could be encouraged 
(and perhaps supported) – within operational constraints 
– to place solid roots in an area and to invest in property, 
as much of the British population has done. Royal Air 
Force and Royal Navy personnel have to some extent 
practised this for some time, albeit without effective 
support from MoD that many think should be provided. 
The move towards super garrisons may eventually 
provide the sort of stability that will be helpful to army 
personnel seeking to lay down solid roots in a particular 
geographical area, although a number of these are likely 
to be far away from the areas in the North of England and 
Scotland where the majority of army recruitment occurs. 
To promote the levels of home ownership in the forces 
to a level in line with the civilian sector, a military 
property bond scheme could be established. Such an 
approach, in which service personnel’s payments into 
the scheme were matched by MoD, would, by the end 
of a 15-year term, provide enough capital to buy a SFA 
or go a long way towards buying a property on the open 
market.67 In the medium to long term the benefit to the 
MoD would be a substantially reduced requirement for 
it to provide and maintain SFA and potentially improved 
morale compared to the consequences of the current 
unsatisfactory situation for many service families. There 
is, however, a great deal of enthusiasm in the MoD for 
the idea of divesting all responsibility for service family 
accommodation. It might therefore be simpler to issue 
a universal accommodation allowance for all service 
personnel. Such an allowance could be linked to CPI, 
thus seeing a real term reduction year on year, whilst 
supporting the notion of self-determination and choice. 
The maintenance of property is another area that has 
been identified as being problematic. Whilst centrally 
65 Ministry of Defence, Securing Britain in an age of uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, (The Stationary Office: London, October 
2010), introduction and p.29.
66 Christopher Leake and Marc Nicol, ‘Troops lose thousands in £1.5m property firms crash’, The Daily Mail, (13 February 2011).
67 There was reference made to this type of scheme in the Military Covenant section. 
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organised FM and maintenance schemes offer efficiencies 
of scale, they must be rooted in local providers and local 
solutions. DE announced a new single contract for the 
provision of all housing-related services to the Armed 
Forces and their families – the National Housing Prime 
Contract in February 2011, which is expected to run from 
2013 for five years. But a more radical system of grants or 
allowances could be introduced that would allow service 
families to maintain or improve their accommodation 
and therefore to incrementally improve the quality of the 
SFA. The review team’s preference would be to issue an 
accommodation allowance that underpins the DE/DIOs 
divestment away from service family accommodation 
whilst supporting the transition of service personnel from 
military to privately owned or rented accommodation. 
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